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INTRODUCTION

The twelve years bet\'1een the end of the Boer War (18991902) and August 1914 were a period of military reform for

Britain. As a result of Army errors and deficiencies, the
military came under criticism and ultimately reform. The
Army was transformed from an unwieldy conglomeration of
units into an expandable striking force ready for overseas
service. Though the Navy had not been involved in the South
African fighting, its defects were readily apparent in the
light of postwar reform. So too were those of high level
military policy making which was then revamped through the
creation of the Committee of Imperial Defence.
British confidence was badly shaken by the period of
Army defeat in December 1899 termed "Black Week." During
this week of disaster, a British field army superior in size
to that of the Boers was defeated at several points with
large sections of the British Cape Colony falling under .
Boer control. r1anpower losses were light in comparison to
European battles-the British lost 1,700 men at their bloodie st defeat while the Austrians had suffered over 20,000
casulties at Sadowa-yet these losses were still severe. for
a nation used to police actions against poorly armed and
disciplined natiV'es. 1 Victory was finally achieved only by

2

employing over 450,000 regulars, reservists, militia, and
volunteers against approximately 50,000 Boers. Sufficient
men were found by stripping the United Kingdom of regular
troops.2 To prevent a reoccurrence of the South African
difficulties, the Report of His Hajesty's Commissioners on
the War in South Africa recognized that the Army would have
to be reorganized into a striking force for imperial and
continental use. 3 Without such a reorganization, 1914 might
have found the British as unprepared as in 1899.
Britain's strength was in her Navy. An efficient Army
might keep the Empire pacified,but it "'as the British Fleet
which preserved the 'Tax

Britannic~land

which made Britain

a world power. In comparison to the conscript armies of
"

"

"

France and Germany, Britain. t s Army ",as insignificant. Yet
Britain was not cowed by continental land powers because
she was an island. The English Channel was a protective
moat for her as long as the Royal Navy was supreme and there
were no means of reaching Britain but by sea. Because of
this, the Fleet was Britain's principal offensive and defensive weapon.
Naval preeminence did not exist unchallenged. The
"Continental" school favored a strong conscripted army to
allO\v the option of intervening directly in European wars.
The opposing "Blue Water" theory believed that a strong "
navy Vias enough protection "for an island nation and that
British troops should never again be risked in continental
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warfare. Blue Water advocates won adoption of their theory
because it did not require conscription, odious to the
British public since the time of Cromwell, and it allowed
the spending of a smaller amount of the British national
income on armaments than was true for continental powers
supporting large armies. 4 The basic difference between the
two schools was in their approaches to fighting a war. In
the early eighteenth century the Continentalists managed
to have a British army committed to European action under
Marlborough. Likewise \'Tellington led a small British army
in Spain against Napoleon and had a large British contingent
",lith him at Waterloo. At the same time Blue Water principles
were adhered to as Britain used her Fleet to seize enemy
colonies and build an empire. Wellington's army in Spain,
it must be remembered, was originally landed and then supplied by sea, and the Royal Navy attacked Napoleon indirectly by establishing a blockade of France. Britain's choice
of Blue Water strategy, then, was not based purely on

eco~

nomic grounds but was rather a combination of these and historical precedent.
Whenever British military thinking is discussed, it must
be viewed in the light of a preference and in fact a more
vital need for the Navy rather than the Army. During the
period

follo~ing

the Boer War the urge to reform, caused

by incompetency in the war, must also be taken into account.
Onc e this is done, a clearer understanding can be gained of

4
British milit?ory thinking duri.ng the period from 1902 until
1914.

I. THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

The Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) was ablethrough its unique structure-to examine various defence
problems, make recommendations carrying great weight, and
coordinate the efforts of the service departments with
those of the rest of the government. After the war began,
the C.l.D.

ser~ed

as a center for directing British effort

and for evaluating various military alternatives.
Three bodies preceded the C.I.D. with function s similar to those it would eventually have. The Colonial Defence
Committee* examined and prepared land defence plans for individual colonies . but never took an overall approach to
impe:r.ial defence. Officers from both services "-!ere members
of the Joint Naval and Military Defence Committee in an
effort to coordinate thinking between the two. Positive
results failed to develop because there was virtually no
support forthcoming from the departmental ministers. At the
Cabinet level there was the Defence Committee. It failed to
achieve the C.I.D.'s later success because it lacked an
*The Colonial Defence Committee, between 1885 and.
1892, drew up 61 colonial defence plans and made 151 individual detailed recommenda.tions. The bulk of this work
was incorporated in the C.I.D.'s War Book of 1911-14. From
Franklyn Arthur Johnson, Defence E.l Committee: The British
Committee of Imperial Defence, 1885-1959 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1960), pp. 20-21 . .
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adequate support structure, proper leadership, and professional service personnel as members. 1
As a result of the Army's poor performance against
the Boers, the Elgin Commission was appointed to investigate military defects as revealed by .the war. Its report,
issued in July 1903, criticized "the planning, the reserve
and manpower system, stores and supplies, and War Office
organization. ,, 2 The report gave official impetus to the
spirit of reform already growing since the end of the war.
In 1902 St. John Brodrick, Secretary for War, and Lord
Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty, threatened the then
Prime r,U nister, Arthur Balfour, with their reSignations if
the Defence Committee was not reorganized to oversee imperial defence. They proposed a committee to consider "those
most difficult and important problems of all, viz.: those
which were neither purely naval, nor purely military , nor
purely naval and military

but which may b e described as naval, military, and political. ,i 3
combined~

Under this pressure,and seeing the need for reform himself, Balfour transformed the Defence Committee into the
C.I.D. with the Colonial Defence Committee and the Joint
Military and Naval Committee becoming subcommittees of it . 4
The Duke of Devonshire, former chairman of the Defence
Committe e , chaired the first meeting of the C.I.D. on 18
December 1902. The Prime Ninister sat as an ordinary mem,...
ber until a year later when Devo.nshire retired and Balfour
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assumed the chairmanship. Membership, to be determined by
the Prime Minister, included the ministerial and professional heads of the service departments as well as their intelligence chiefs. 5 A major innovation,on the Defence Committee ,
was the provision of a clerk to take minutes of meetings.
This was a deviation from Cabinet procedure 6 and \vas to
be the first step towards establishing a secretariat.
The first report of the Esher Committee, set up to
reorganize the War Office, stressed in January 1904 that
there had been "no means for co-ordinating defence problems "
during the war. It further said that there was no agency
to attack these problems as a whole and to define "the
proper functions of the various elements" making up imperial
defence. The report concluded by recommending the formation of an agency to ensure that "peace preparations are
carried out upon a consistent plan, and,.. . . . that, ,in
times of emergeancy? a definite war policy upon solid data
can be formulated.,,7 As of this time Balfour had not made
these additions to the C.I.D.'s functions and so consequently its final form was yet to be achieved.
Lord Esher, chairman of the committee,applied personal
pressure for the formation of an effective C.I.D. A confidant of the King,* prime ministers, cabinets , and military
- *Admiral Sir John Fisher wrote of Esher in 1906: "You
know he is a 'man of affairs' and is more in the hidden counsels of the King and his Ninisters(and 'His r'lajesty'§. ~
sition ' al s o!) then perhaps any man living!!! From Arthur

B

authori ties-. he was able to influence important minds in
favor of the Esher Committee's recommendations. B On 14
February 1903 Esher wrote the King ''that the Prime r.1inister
is a Nember but not the President of the Defence Committee;
an arragement perhaps natural under existing circumstances,
but which should not be taken as a precedent . ,, 9 Balfour
was, of course, to follow this advice and become chairman .
Esher wrote Balfour in January 1,904 on the equally vi tal
question of a secretariat for the committee. He recommended
that the secretary should not be a member of the C.I.D. and
should only express an opinion when requested to do so by
the chairman. His duties, Esher wrote:
. . . would be to prepare material for the Prime
Minister, collected from these sources, [the Ad::
miral ty and the War Office] as well as from other
departments, in order that the · Defence Committee
[the old name for the C.I.DJ may lay down principles of action, which would in certain eventu.alities .co-ordinate the efforts of these two high
professional offices~
The major innovati.on in Esher's recommendatien was that
the committee would be informed dnissues independently by
the secretariat before the professionals were to be called as
witnesses. 10By this means the C-.I.D. WGuld be expert
enough to evaluate military advice critically and therefore make more intelligent recommendations.
Remembering Esher's advice, Balfour created the organiJ .. r.'I arder, ed., Fear God and Dreadnought:

~ Correspondence
of Admiral of th~ Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, vol. 2:
Years of Pow~, 1904-191,gCLondon: Jonathan Cape, 1956), pp.
107-0B. .
.
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zation of the permanent C.I.D. in his famous Treasury
Minute of 4 May 1904. Parliament approved the proposal
later that year despite opposition by the Liberals to
some specific points. It immediately vlon wide popularity
among the press and public. 11 In creating the structure of
the C. I. D. ,Balfour b oth drew on the advice of men like
Esher and corrected the deficiencies demonstrated in the
committee ' s predece ssors.
The prinCiple of collective responsibility for the
Cabinet \vas retained by making the C. I. D. advisory; decision
making power and hence responsibility remained with the
Cabinet. C.I.D. recommendations were influential because
the Prime Ninister and cabinet ministers were the members
making them. r-1ili tary professionals were included as full
members so they could express their opinions without being
inhibited by the.presence of the politicians. The Prime '
Minister, the person ultimately responsible for defence
and war planning, \'las kept well informed on military developments via his position as chairman. 12 Flexibility of membership was also an important quality of the C.I.D. Only the
Prime IvIinister was a permanent member; the others were appointed by him and served at his pleasure. This allowed him
to ·give temporary membership to military and civilian experts when their knowledge would add to a current committee
investigation or discussion. As early as 1903, the Canadian
Minister of Defence and Militia, Sir Frederick Borden, was

10
asked to attend several C. I .D. meetings to vlhich he added
his views on dominion participation in imperial defence. 13
In 1905 Esher was appointed as a special non-governmental
14
'
member of the C.l.D., and Balfour continued as a member
after he and the Conservatives had left otfice. 15 These
men were able to serve because of the committee's membership flexibility. The diversity of opinion thus gained was
vital for the consideration of a_topic as broad as imperial
defence.
~~en'

the Liberals came to power in 1906, there was

some question as to whether the New Prime rr.inister, Henry
Campbell-Bannerman, \.,ould retain the C. I . D. Hany Liberals
feared that the military professionals might be able to
force through a recommendation Unpopular to ' Parliament
which, since the, professionals were not responsible to it,
would have to take action ag~inst the mini~ters.16 R. B.
Haldane, future reorganizer of the Army and a supporter of
the C.l.D., convinced Campbell-Bannerman to retain it as
a valuable facet of the government. Nevertheless, the new
Prime Hinister took
had Balfour ,

'- lases!.'

~ ~

interest in the C. I. D. than

consequently fewer meetings were held (six-

teen sessions under Campbell-Bannerman compared with sixty
under Balfour).17 Of course it has already been explained
that the question of ministerial responsibility brought tip
by the Liberals in 1906 had been the reason why Balfou+ had
only given the committ e e advisory priwer in the first place.
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Permanent subcommitte e s of the C.I . D. eventually included the Colonial (changed after 1911 to Overseas) Defence
Sub-Committee, Home Ports Defence Sub-Committee, Air Committee, and Committee on the Co-ordination of Departmental
Action. Numerous ad-hoc committees were formed for investigating issues not covered by the permanent ones. The use of
subcommittees allowed the time necessary for the investigation and analysis of complex defenc e problems. 18 The s.ubcom.rni ttee system complemented the

c. I .D. ' s flexibility on

other matters by allowing the experts on particular questions
to study them and then report to the full C. I. D. without
the need of wasting the latter's time with routine investigative work.
A boost came to the committee in 1908 when the efficient
r·laurice Hankey was appointed to it · as Assistant Secretary
and then made Secretary in 1912. He was to hold this post
until 1938. 19 In the. year Hankey joined the C.I .D., only
two meetings were held and no more than nine papers were
discussed. Three years later eight meetings took place and
over fifty papers were submitted fo r consideration. 20 ·
By 1914 subcommittees of the C.I.D. had studied such
diverse subjects as the treatment of neutral and enemy
shipping during \'iar, wartime food requirements of the British Isles, censorship, the defence of key colonial baseSt

u

and war risk insurance. Besides studying military problems,
which also received the attention of the service departments,
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the C.I.D. was able to enter into the civil and economic
sphere where they could not. 21 Discussion and resolution
of the invasion and conscription issues also took place in
the C.I.D. as did the battl~ between the Continentalists
- and those supporting the Blue \Ilater school. Strategic
planning, on the other hand, was initiated at the vfar Office
and the Admiralty; they were also responsible for much of
their own war preparation. A grave discrepancy in the record of the C.I.D. was that it failed to consider what
administrative changes in the government would be necessary
in time of war.22 Even so, the committee ' s contributions
far outweigh this oversight, major though it was.
Another C.I.D. failure came when it tried to coordinate
activity between the War Office and the Admiralty. As early
as 1905, Balfour had suggested that the cOIIlIhitteeshould
take up the question of combotned operations between the two
services,but discussions did not materialize. Subseque:p.tly,
though, a group of officers representing both services began
meeting informally at Whitehall Gardens to discuss the
matter. Fisher, fearing a possible naval comm.ittment to
Continental ideas held by the Army, collapsed the talks by
withdrawing the naval contingent. The talks were never
reopened. Hence a disaster like Gallipoli was certain to
occur because of the lack of cooperation between the services. 23 ~rhe C. I. D. did, nonetheless ~_ provide a forum where
military plans and information were -reviewed by committee
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members representing both services.
I~lany

officers at the Admiralty and the War Office

feared that the C.I.D. might supplant the service departments in the area of military policy making. The prestige
received by ministers who were members of the committee was
resented by those ,.,ho were not. Fisher's antagonism stemmed
from his desire to keep Admiralty matters secret and also
from his dislike for

C.I.D~'s

Secretary, Sir George Clarke

(1904-07) because of Clarke's criticism of the Dreadnought.
Fisher's sucessor as First Sea Lord, Admiral A.K. Wilson
also opposed any C. I. D. meddling \,/i ththe planning of naval
operations. Esher commented in 1909 that recommendations
made by the C.I.D. were received by the services "as the
amiable aberrations of a fevl well-meaning but harmless amateur strategists." The committee's influence with the mili~
tary.began to grow only after the addition of Hankey, with
his objectivity and superlative tact, as Secretary.24
In 1905 the C.I.D. recommended the formation of a
committee to inspect and reorganize, if necessary, the defences of home and colonial naval bases. General Sir John
Owen chaired the committee which did its ''lork, both at home
and abroad, in 1905-06. 25 It drew up plans which were approved "for rearming the defences of the great naval bases
at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham.".· Plans laid do\'m for
the defences at Rosyth (see Map 1) were later revised by
the Owen COTILrnittee's sucessor, the Home Ports Defence Sub-

· 14

Committee. No provisions were made for defences at Cromarty
while the Fleet's eventual wartime base, Scapa Flow, was not
considered as more than an emergeancy anchorage.
later wrote in

~

26

.

Hankey

Supreme Command, c.oncerning overseas

bases, that because they had been designed against France
and not Germany whose coast could easily by blockaded: "Poli ....
tical and strategic considerations necessitated putting our
resources into mobile ships and armies and cutting down to
an absolute minimum our expenditure on passive defences.,,27
This decision favored both Blue Water advocates and those
who saw Germany as the only likely foe for Britain in the
near future.
The nO\-1 famous ltlar Book began in 1910 wi tha paper · submitted to the C.I.D. by the General Staff entitled "Questions Requiring Inter-Departmental consideration." A major
complaint in the ,paper was the lack of cooperation

between

the services. Later in the year Hankey wrote a paper called
"Co-ordin~tion

of Departmental Action on the outbreak of

War;" which dealt with the same topic. The question of creating a war book was taken up in January 1911 by a subcommittee chaired by Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Under-Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs. In December Esher again brought
his influence to bear by proposing that the 1;[ar Book SubCommittee be made permanent; this was done soon after. The
first printed proof of the War Book was approved in April
1912; in December the Colonial Office notified the Dominions
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of the War Book' s existence so they could adopt a similar
system.

28

.

When war carne in 1914, the War Book allovred the

government to smoothly move onto a wart.ime footing except
for· the Treasury ",hose war book was described by Hankey as
being " jejune and inadequate. 1I The War Book was such a
success that Haldane was able to write Hankey on 2 August
1914: "The arrangements appear to me to be working out almost faultlessly.1I 2 9
Without doubt the · C.I.D. made a great contribution to .
Britain's war readiness. If not for the War Book and the
committee ' s other accomplishments, confusion and disorder
might have reigned to the extent of dwarfing that of 1899.
The advisory nature of the committee has been criticized,
but the presence of the Prime iJiinister and cabinet ministers
as members meant those who made the reoommendationswould
also have the power to adopt , them. Above all, it was the
C.I.D.'s capability to study the broad question of imperial
defence that made it an inestimably important element of
Britain's war preparedness and military thinking.

I I. THE ARr·1Y

Army reform was directly a result of its :failu:r:.es in
the Boer War. The major innovations were an Army Council,
a Genral Staff, Haldane ' s reorganization of the :field army,
and the institution of new' tactics. Another important development was the opening of staff talks with the French '
Army, thus drawing the nation closer to a continental commitment.
The Esher Committee, also known as The \var O:ffice
(Reconstruction) Committee made three main recommendations
in 1904: the formation of an Army Council similar to the
Board of Admiralty, the creation of a Genral Staff, and the
reorganization o:f departmental responsibilities at the 1:1ar
Office. 1 Part of this reorganization was accomplished by
the establishment of the C.I.D. Its other recommendations
were adopted during 1904 which set the stage :for Haldanets
own reform program.
Army related policy questions were to be considered
and decided by the Army Council. As constituted, it included
seven members-three civilian and four military. The Civilian
Members were the Secretary of State for War, the financial
secretary, and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary , in charge
of a ll civil busines s other than finance. The four Nilitary
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Members had responsibilities divided into: operations and
military policy, recruitment and di s cipline, supply and
transport, and armaments and fortifications. 2 Assisting
each of the members was a director. While the members considered matters of policy, the Esher Committee specified
that "administration will devolve upon the Direct·ors. fI It
also advised the "appointment of Nilitary men who have not
hitherto been connected with existing methods, and are ,
therefore, not likely to be embarrassed by the traditions
of a system \"hich is to be radically changed. " 3 Esher wrot e
Balfour in December 1903, stressing that the Army Council
should "be set going at once, as a representative body, i.e.
representative of the great branches of the" ltlar Office with
the details of its organization being left until after its
formation. 4 On 6 February 1904 Letters Patent instituted
the Army Council and at the same time eliminated the post
of CQmmander-in-Chief in order to make room for it. The
War Office Council and Army Board was also abolished at the
same time. 5 This was the substance of the Army Council which
would be complimented by the creation of the General Staff .
By an Army order , the Genral Staff was officially
created in January 1905, but it remained a skeleton until
the Army Council was able to define its functions and select and appoint the officers to man it . Esher complained
of the nearly two year delay which occurred, saying that
the Army Council had " done practically nothing" regarding
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the Staff during that time. In fact, it was not until Octo ....
ber 1906 that the new Liberal Government brought the Staff
up to operational level. 6 Staff duties were divided between
the Director of Military Operations, the Director of Staff
Duties, and the Director of r1ili tary Training. The . Chief of
the General Staff took over the responsibility of-_preparing
the Army for war from the defunct office of Commander-:-inChief. As a result of the decision by the Imperial Conference of 1907 to adopt similar military "methods and forms "
throughout the Empire, the General Staff was renamed the
Imperial General Staff (I.G.s.).7 The creation of the Staff
at last provided the British Army with a body to make detailed plans and studies 'o f future possible operations.
Also adopted was the Esher .Cornmittee's recommendation
for the provision of a set of manuals.

covering all aspects

of military training and another on: more specialized subjects. Guidelines \'lere set up in them for staff work from
the highest to lowest levels. This greatly facilitated the
rapid expansion of the Army in 1914 because officers at all
levels understood the fundamentals of training and organizing
an army.8 Field Service Regulations, Part I-Operations-1909
was adopted as the field army's general manual in 1909.
General Sir Douglas Haig, as Director of rilili tary Training
and later Director of Staff Duties, was responsible for it
and Part II-Organization and Administration-1909 which defined and explained the "duties and ·functions of officers,
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units , and command s in the Lines of Communictions.,,9
'dar Office departmental responsibility was di vi<;led,
as a result of the Esher Committee ' s Report, between the
Chief of the General · Staff, the Adjutant-General, and the
l-1aster-·General of the Ordinance. The welfare arid maintenance
of the · troops was the responsibility of the Adjutant-General
while the JiIaster-General of Ordinance oversaw everything.
to do with artillery and fortifications. Above all the Esher
Committee stressed:
The line of cleavage between the duties of the
several staff officers should be . • . rigorously
preserved. It is essential to ·prevent the confusion of staff a rrangements which has hitherto prevailed.
It further said that military administration· should be kept
decentralized "if the Army is to be trained and to exercise
the in.i tiative and the independence of judgement which are
essential in the ,field.,,10 With the completion of these
reforms, the remaining need was for the reorganization of
the actual field army.
The difficulties in raising an army for use against
the Boers dictated a reorganization of the British field
forcetinto some sort of striking force which could be
quickly assembled for action in either a colonial conflict
or major European war. The need for reform did not ensure
success as three secretaries for war and two governments
grappled with the problem before a solution was found. Even
then the reorganization was attacked from all sides before
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it was finally adopted. .
Brodrick, Secretary for War 1900-03, failed to reorganize the field army because of the ambitious nature of
his proposals. His plan was to create a force of six army
corps. This was far too large considering the declining
recruitment rates and the probable negative reaction of
voters to the higher taxes which would have resulted.
Brodrick ' s goal was to have three army corps plus a cavalry
divison, a force of about 120,000 men, ready at a moment's
notice for service anywhere. 11 Though Brodrick termed his
scheme a "paper transaction," it still would have required
the addition of 50,000 men at an increase in expenditures of
~3

million. The total increase in Army estimates was

estimated at

~5

million over those of the previous year .

Joining in the debate was a rising young politician named
Winston Churchill. He questioned the· need to have three
army corps ready for immediate service when

o~e

vIas "quite

enough to fight savages, and three not enough even to begin
to fight Europeans.,,12 By 1903 :·Brddrick's · bluepr·i rit·. was
only the First Corps at Aldershot had
begun formation, and it dld lnot even have its brigadiers. 13
still just that,

~

Brodrick ' s successor at the War Office, H. O. ArnoldForster, also failed in his attempt to create an effective
striking force. Arnold-Forster proposed the creation of a
General Service Army of long term service, nine years with
the colors and three years in the reserves; and a Home
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Service Army with short term service, two years with the
colors and six in the reserves. The General Service Army,
approximately the same size as Brodrick 's three corps, was
to serve as a striking force. It \vas to be composed of men
legally old enough to serve overseas so that the reserves
would not be eaten up replacing thosE! too young as had
occurred in the past. The Home Service Army wp.s to' be the
c01;rnterpar't of the continent t s conscript armies , without
conscription, and was to be available to reinforce the
General Service Army, if necessary.

Ad~inistrative

districts,

recommended by the Esher Committee, were to replace Brodrick's
system of army corps districts for organizational and
business purposes. One grave oversight of the plan was its
failure to incorporate any of the auxiliary forces such as
the militia into the system. Before Arnold-Forster's proposals could be adopted, the Balfour Gove..rnment.fell. 14
Coming to the War Office with the new Liberal

Govern~

ment in 1906, Haldane would accomplish a completereorganiztion of Bri tain-r s field forces by 1909. Haldane r s first
move was to gather around him a group of young officers
such as Haig and Colonel Gerald Ellison (former Secretary
of the Esher Committee) to advise him on his reform schemes.
He described them as "a thinking school of officers who desire to see the full efficiency which comes from neVi organi-

()

zation and no surplus energy running to waste. 1I15 . With their
advice, Haldanevtas ready to challenge and then reshapet.he

22

the British Army.
In order to create his desired six division Expeditionary Force, Haldane had to actually reduce certain elements of the Army to find men needed for more vital areas.
His proposed reduction of the Brigade of Guards by two bat-

talions raised criticism from the , pro-military faction.
Esher told the King that General Sir John French would
rather give up four batteries of artillery than see the
Guards reduced. In contrast, members of his own party like
a Mr. Vivian called for more economy. On 9 May 1906 Vivian
moved: "That this House of Commons is of the ' opinion that
the growth of expenditure in armaments is excessive and
ought to be reduced.,,16 Haldane's method of shifting men
to fill gaps \'las the best way to achieve oath efficiency
and economy. An example of this was his reorganization of
the artillery. Haldane inherited more guns than gunne,rs
because of Brodrick's expansion of the regular field artillery for his six corps. Modern artillery's faster rates of
fire required longer ammunition columns to carry the extra
shells needed. As a result, only

forty~two '

out of ninety-

three batteries in 1906 could have been manned along with
their ammunition columns. Haldane ' s solution was simple,
yet decisive in its results. He manned the ammunition '
columns with men freed by eliminating 300 guns of the IVlilitia Royal Garrison Artillery . 17
On 17 July 1906 Haldane presented his proposed reforms

23
to the House of Commons. He claimed that his reforms would
restore public confidence by making "people feel they are
getting value for their money." Though his proposals carried
with them considerable monetary savings, Haldane indicated
that he had the full backing of the Army Council because
it realized the need for economy.and would thus see to it
that "every penny spent on the Army is spent on fighting
efficiency." Then he went on to outline his plan for an'
Expeditionary Force of six "great Divisions." This, containing most of the regular army, was designed for overseas
Use while other forces would be used for home defence. Total
manpower needed for the Expeditionary Force was 150,000 men
of vlhich 50,000 would be with their units ,70,000 would be
reservists, and 30,000 in the militia. 18 Significantly, the
militia was to contain no infantry and only 3,200 yeomanry
cavalry. The remainder belonged to the artillery, the Army
Service Corps, and the engineers of the Expeditionary Force.19
In a Special Army Order of January 1907, the exact organization to be adopted by the Army was laid

~ut.

In addition

to the six infantry divisions there was to bea cavalrydivision, made up out of the four cavalry brigades, for use as
an independent force. From four mounted infantry battalions
and two cavalry regiments,two cavalry brigades were created
to be used as a close reconnaissance force for the infantry.
Artillery was allotted to the divisions, none being held
bac-k as a corps reserve. 20

(

24
All this was accomplished, •and ..(2,036,000 \'las cut
from the 1907-08 estimates, mainly due to reductions in
infantt='y and artillery superfluous to the reorganization.
The size of the Expeditionary Force was , said Haldane,
"limited by the establi.shment necessary to preserve in
order to find drafts and reliefs for the forces abroad. "
For seven years the regular army was to remain at the size
determined by Haldane until the necessities of war required radical expansion. 21
· Next, Haldane turned his attention to transforming
the auxiliary forces into a cohesive home defence force
and reserve for the regular army. The British Army in 1898
consisted of over a half a million men, not counting colonial and native troops, but they were divided up among a
number of different organizations:
regular armx overseas
124,000
regular army at home
131,000
the army reserve section "A" *
5,000
the remainder of the army reserve 73,000
the militia reserve
30,000
militia effectives
65,000
10,000
yeomanry effectives
volunteer effectives
230,000 22
Despite the large numbers on paper, it was found difficult
to find even a few divisions available for South African
service in 1900. This was because the regular army based in
Bri tain was an integral part of the home defence force. 111any
*These reservists were legally capable of joining the'
regulars without the need for a proclamation to call · them
onto active duty. They were in their first year of reserve.
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of the auxiliary units sent in the place of regular ones
proved to be lacking in both quality and training. 23 vfhat
was needed, was a force of regulars for overseas duty and
another force specifically designed for use at home.
By Haldane '8 plan, the British Army was to consist
of "two categories and two only." Further division, he
said, would "end in leaving us weak and ill organized everywhere . " He wanted an Army consisting of a "Field Force ll
and a "Territorial" or home force. The Field Force had
already been created by him through his Army Order and was
"to be •

ready in all respects for mobilization on the

outbreak of a great war." The next step was to form the
Territorials who were to be mobilized at the same time as
the regulars but were to train for six -months before being
called upon for the "support and expansion" of the Expedi-tionary Force. 24
The auxiliary forces-the volunteers, yeomanry, and
militia-- would be transformed into fourteen infantry and
fourteen cavalry divisions plus the . necessary support units .
The unit organizations themselves were transferred s o that,
except for the horse artillery, almost everyone could trace
its origins back to either the yeomanry or volunteers . Ten
cyclist battalions and a Territorial r'ledical Corps were formed at the same time . Administration was to be placed in
the hands of the County Associations. Eac;h would be responsibl e for recruit ment, clothing, and general maintenance of
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the units under it s control. War Offices grants were made
on the basis of how many men each association cared for.
Training was exclusively under the control of the War .
O'f f'
' lce. 25

Rather than reorganizing the auxiliary forces by Army
Order and then having Parliament accept or reject his
estimates because of it, as had been done for thereorganization of the regulars, Haldane needed an act of Parliament.
This was because his proposed changes would affect provisions of the Army Act, the Reserve Forces Act of 1882, and
the Reserve Forces and £1ili tia Act of 1898. In addition, the
County Associations would need statutory authority in order
to carry out their role of administering public . funds and
property. Because of the economies in his earlier reforms,
Haldane enjoyed more support from his own party; because
of his success in increasing the Armyts

men
such as Esher and Balfour were warm to his proposals. 26
~fficiency,

Nevertheless, the opposition he faced was strong and deep
. rooted. General Evelyn Wood, a former Quartermaster-General,
warned Ellison that, "If you organize the British Army,
you'll ruin it." Liberals such as Lloyd George and Churchill
attacked the proposals, introduced in February 1907, because
the'",icreated too large a force while Unionists and sortle foreign
observers considered it too

small~

Other critics termed the

Territorials a "phantom army" which would never be able to
mobilize itself for war. When war did come, the County of
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London Association, controlling more units than any other,
was able to quickly bring all its units up to strength,
even those thirty percent below establishment. Finally,
there Vias opposition from diehard Tories vlho saw his reforms
as an attack on privilege. Ellison explained that:
Each unit had come to be regarded, in a sense, as
the property of the Commanding Officer who conceived it to be his duty to preserve intact its
status and its financial stability. Accordingly
the prospect 0;( drastic changes . • . \Vas far
from popular. 2'{
Despite this opposition, the necessary legislation passed
the House of Commons in June 1907 by a vote of 283 to 63.
Haldane gave Balfour -much of the credit for its easy
passage. In the House of Lords, the Unionist leader, Lord
Lansdovlne ,

was "sympathetic and reasonable" so he too

supported the reforms. This assured passage in the Lords . 28
As of 1 April 1908, the old volunteer units tvere diss.olved
with their men being given the opportunity to join the new
Terri torials. By

1 May over 72,000 had; by 1 'J:urie

144,620 men had been recruited out of an official·establishment of 302,000. Over 100,000 men took part that year in
the Territorials ' first summer training session and by the
end of the year the Terri torials totalled over 207,000 men.
One reason for this rapid filling up of the ranks was the
high press and popular support received. As a result 1 Haldane,when introducing his estimates i.n 1910, was able to
tell Parliament that Territorial numbers had reached 88.5
percent of establishment . 29 He had summed up his hopes for
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the Territorials when he first introduced his proposal:
And our belief is that at the end of that time a
period of transition . . . not only would they
[the Territorials] be enormously more efficient
than the Volunteers or Yeomanry forces at this
present time, but that they would be ready, finding themselves in their units, to say, "We wish
, to go abroad and take our part in the theatre of
war, to fight in the interests of the nation and
for the defence of the Empire. n30
Unfortunately, when war came, Kitchener scrapped this whole
system and started his ovm, one which centered on himself
and thus ''las much like the one revolving around the Commander-in-Chief which Haldane had replaced. 31
Only a few minor changes were made in the Territorial
system after 1908. In 1909 the Veteran Reserve, renamed
the National Reserve, was created; it numbered 5,464
officers and 185,372 other ranks by January 1913. The mil i tia was slowly dismantled by incorporating some units into
the

~egular

army and by drawing off men for the new Special

Reserve. Only 636 men remained in the militia and 64 in the
militia reserve as of 1913.32 Another innovation came when
the \vard Committee recommended in 1907 the formation of an
Officer's Training Corps. This was instituted in 1908 with
Senior Divisions in nineteen universities and Junior Divisions in 152 Public schools. The number of schools participating steadily increased until there were 630 officers
and 23 ,701 other ranks in the program as of 1912.33 At this
point, Haldane's major reforms were completed. The remainyears before the war \'fere spent by him and his successor in
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defending the Army from critics and readying it for war.
Conscription was avoided by the Haldane reforms because
it would have been politically unfeasible for the antimilitarist Liberals. This brought about criticism from
former Commander-in-Chief and th-en President of the national
Service League, Lord Roberts. Roberts and other conscriptionisiis believed that only a large compulsory service
army could ensure Britain's future position as a world
power. Though he opposed Haldane's volunteer force, Roberts
\vas not opposed to reform. He explained that: "\lie only
differ as to the means by which that object can be obtained. ,, 34 The C.I.D. examined the question of conscription
in 1908. In spite of the argument made by Colonel Charles

a Court

Repington, military correspondent for The Times,

that compulsory service was "indispensable in order to safeguard the country against invasion" and that "it would improve the physique, discipline and morale of the whole na- '.
tion," the C.I.D. found that "Universal Training" was unnecessary. 35
British tactical doctrine was based on the experience
gained in the Boer War and on observation of the 1904-05
Russo-Japanese War. Other nations also drew conclusions
from these events. German theorists said that a future ''far
would be decided by masses of heavy artillery which would
be necessary to breakdown trenches and overpower the expected fierce defensive fire. The French trusted in- infantry
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assaults

clo~ely

supported by light quick-firing mobile

artillery. British experts were convinced that the avoidance of rigid" doctrine . and the reliance on good fieldcraft (the use of terrain to cover attacks rather than exposing them to withering fire in the open) along with rapid
and accurate rifle-fire would be the road to victory.36 . In
1904 Esher described the men he had seen at that year!'s
maneuvers as being full of "zeal and keenness~,,37 A foreign
observer made note of the Army ' s tactics during the same
maneuvers:
In their manoeuvres the British infantry showed
great skill in the use of ground. Their thin
lines of khaki-clad skirmishers "'ere scarcely
visible. No detachment was ever seen inclose
order wi thin three thousand yards of the enemy .
Frontal attacks were entirely avoided . . . • . ) 8
These tactics showed great evolution from the close order
parade ground formations which had met disaster against
the Boer riflemen.
This trend, however, did not carryover to the cavaIry. After the failure of the cavalry ' s shock tactics in
the Boer \lIar, the lance and sword \'lere were taken out of
use with the emphasis being put on the rifle in a mounted
infantry role. Churchill supporiE'd the decision in Parliament when he declared that he

If

could not understand ho\¥

anyone who looked at the matter from an impartial point of
view could possibly prefer the lance to the rifle . 1I His
opinion was based on his experience as both an officer
and \iar correspondent in South Africa. Nevertheless, in
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1907 the lance, absolutely useless for anything but shock
action, was reintroduced. 39 Additional evidence- £or the
permanent abelition of shock tactics had even been demenstarted in the Russo-Japanese

~lar

where the "rifle was

supreme." The only charges made 'I,'.Tere with the rifle,

· 11

some

very deadly. " General Sir Jehn French, who. had himself
abandoned shock tactics in South Africa, chastised the
Russian cavalry because, "They were devoid of real Cavalry
training, they thought of nothing but getting off their
. horses and shoot ing !t1.-0 Infantry manuals assessed the si tuation more realistically as they advised that cavalry
charges could be repulsed by small arms fire without the
need to even halt an advance. 41 In 1914 mounted cavalry
was soon relegated to . the rear areas for its

O\~

protec-

tion. Unfortunately, former cavalry generals like French
and Haig, in positions of power once the .war began, continued to make bloody infantry assaults attempting to. open
a gap wide enough for the cavalry to exploit. Every time
success seemed assured, the cavalry vlouldbe held up . bya
few machineguns or other obstacles. Near the end of the
war another kind of cavalry, tanks, were finally able to
fill the exploitation role.
The deplbyment of the British Expeditionary Force (B.
E.F.) was a great source of controversy throughout the
decade

])r:e:ced~lng

the war. Bri tish commitment to a Contin-

ental strategy began with talks between the British and
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French general staffs, but there was much opposition to
it. Admiral Wilson suggested in 1905 that if war came with
Germany, the Army should be used to carry out amphibious
operations against the German coast. A \var Office study,
done at the prompting of the Admiralty, concluded that the
German Baltic coast was an impossible target for such an
operation because of the existence of the German Fleet and
the presence of impressive coastal defences;. any attack
against the Kiel Canal, with the forces thought likely to
be available, was also declared doomed to failure unless
it received considerable French assistance. 42 From the \'lar
Office point of view, this study effectively ended further
consideration of a Blue Water strategy.
A war game analysis, the same year , of a hypothetical
Franco-German war convinced the General Staff that in such
a war the British would have time to transport the B<.E.F.
to the battlefront . This was assuming that Britain VTould
enter the 'var only after Belgium neutrality was violated,
several x;eeks into the fighting, thus giving Britain preparatory time. The General Staff predicted that, for fear
of antagonizing Britain, Germany would not invade Belgium

except as a last resort. A General Staff estimate predicted
that the Army could have two corps in Antwerp within twentytwo · days of a war declaration . 43 These conclusi.ons meant
that intervention by the B. E.F. in a European war was logistically feasible.
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General Sir James Grierson, Director of lJiili tary
Operations

(D~M.O.),

initiated a study in 1906 which con-

cluded that colony seizing and amphibious landings would
have little effect on a continental war. It . declared that
only a combined British-French counterattack of the expected
German invasion of Belgium could be

decisive~

If Belgium

were not invaded, British assistance should still be given
to the French because, it said, without it Germany would
be victorious. 44 This study was the first to consider
assistance to France without Belgian neu4rality being violated. Clarke, C.I.D. Secretary, also advised direct aid
to France in the event of war without an invasion of Belgium
by Germany. A Whitehall conference on 6 January 1906 agreed
that at the outset of a "'Tar British military cooperation
should consist of either an expedition to Belgium or direct assistance to the French Army defending its :front,iers.
The Admiralty representatives argued for coastal raids but
were defeated when they could not , .gua~ante,e ;iiava:J; _:s"u.pfr:c~ority
in the face of a German fleet trying to interfere with a
landing. As of 9 January, Sir" Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary, sanctioned the continuance of talks already started .
with the French General Staff, but he did not yet inform

Campbell~Bannerman of their exist.ence. 45 In mid-January
Campbell-Bannerman also approved of the conversations. But
before he did this, the Prime Einister had Grierson and the
French representative, Major Huguet, make a written statement
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declaring that the discussions did not commit Britain to
any course of action. 46
By May the talks had produced detailed railroad timetables for the transport of the B.E.F . to the front once
it arrived in France. Information was gained which revealed
that, :in case of invasion, the Belgians would concentrate
their army around Brussels for the defence of Antwerp. Plans
were laid for the B.E.F. to concentrate on the Meuse by the
tenth day after declaring war. An inspection of the Belgian
and French armies by Grierson found him much more impressed
by the latter, causing him to press for joint planning vii th
it rather than with the Belgians. During the remainder of
1906 the Genral Staff became more and more convinced that any
action to support Belgium would have to be made in cooperation with France. Grierson's successor, General Sir Spencer
Ewart, continued his preference for direct aid to France.
Officially, though, no commitment
in April 1907

Campbell-Bannerm~n

h~d

been made. In fact,

told the French Prime r<Iini-

ster, Georges Clemenceau, that British public opinion \'1ould
not "allow of British troops being employed on the Continent
of Europe. 1I47 On 28 October 1908 the C.I.D. began an _inquiry
into what government policy should be regarding a continental commitment. Its report; ratified by the entire C.I.D. on
24 July 1909, advised that British intervention should not
entirely hinge upon a violation of Belgian neutrality. It
also provided for, subject to Cabinet approval, the
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concentration of' four British inf'antry dj.visions.. and one
cavalry division on the French lef't. 48
Little more was done until General Sir Henry Wilson
became D.M . O. in August 1910. His calculation that the
Germans would come through Belgium with as many as f'orty
divisions against thirty-seven to thirty-nine French ones
meant that the B.E.F. could. be the edge needed f'or victory ,
especially if' all six divisions were sent. 49 General Wilson
presented the War Of'fice ' s detailed plans to the C.I.D. in
1911. The Admiralty representative; Admiral. A. K. Wilson
was unprepared to off'er anything but vague alternatives to
. 50
the War Of'f'ice plan and so it was accepted by the C.I.D.
An agreement between General Wilson and General Dubail,
the French Chief' of the War Ministry Staf'f, on 20 July 1911
provided f'or, in the event of' war, the landing of' the B.E.F .
at Le HaI.'.v~ Boulogne, and Rouen between the 4th and 12t.h days
of' mobilization, and that it..'.wouldthen be concentrated
in the Maubeuge area starting on the 13th day. General Wilson summarized his position to Grey and Haldane as being:
"First,\ve must join the French. Second, we must mobilize
the same day as the Frenoh. Third, vIe must send all six
divisions.,,51 Churchill wrote Lloyd George on 31 August
1911 that General Wilson had inf'ormed him that if' war.
came , British strategy would be to "move into a f'riendly
Belgium" a nd to " threaten the German flan k in conjunction
with the Belgian arrny.,,52
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All the War Offic e plans hinged on a British declaration of war on Germany. This was up to the British Cabinet.
Once war was declared, however, there was little room for
variance from the War Office's plans since to do so would
take up precious time. Britain, then, was essentially
committed to a Continental strategy if War \Vas declared
on Germany .

III. THE NAVY

Because of her island status, the Royal Navy was by
far Britain's most basic military arm. Fisher ''las able to
write in 1910 \1i th more than just a little justification
that, "Comparatively, the Navy is vital and the Army is a
play thing! ,,1 Among the duties of the British Fleet wa~ the
protection of Britain from invasion, the defence of British
shipping, the transport of the Army to the continent,and
the defeat of the enemy's fleet. To accomplish these goals
the Navy had to have a superiority at sea which would ensure victory with little chance of' failure,for so much depended on its success. Naval superiority was the guiding
reason for Fisher's reforms, the

Anglo-G~rman

naval race,

Churchill's reforms, and the opening of discussions with
the French for a British withdrawal from the Mediterranean
Sea .
Fisher became Second Sea Lord in 1902 and then First
Sea Lord on 21 October 1904. In this position, which he
was to hold until 1910, Fisher

transfor~ed

the British

Navy, and naval warfare in general, from using saili"ng ·age
tactics in an age of steam to one employing long range
gunnery, torpedoes, and eventually aircraft. He \'las \"ell
endowed with the forceful character necessary to impose
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his reforms on an unwilling Navy. Fisher once described
himself as: "I entered the navy penniless, friendless and
forlorn. I have had to fight like

hel~

and fighting like

hell has made me what I am. ,,2 Obviously a man l .ike this
would not shrink from imposing unpopular reforms if he
thought them necessary.
Personnel reform began \vith the Selborne Scheme of
1902 , launched in 1903-05. It made officer training uniform for the three naval branches-executive, engineering,
and marine-until men became lieutenants (at about age 22)
when they would be allowed to specialize in one of the
three areas. Upon attaining the rank of commande.r, the
specialty was to be dropped unless the individual had no
wish to command a. ship. Many officers did reach high rank
by remaining with an engineering or marine specialty. The
Selborne Scheme was instituted because under the former
,
system of separate training for each branch esprit de corps
had suffered as the excuti ve branch*" had considered itself
superior to the others. Marine officers had had few shipboard duties and so felt out of place until the Selborne
Scheme gave them the basic training necessary to run a
ship and to understand what was going on. Executive officers,
on the other hand, learned what propelled a ship. \vhile
engineers were educated in how to fight one . Henoe officers
of the three branches became somewhat interchangeable and
·~In charge of navigation, gunnery, and torpedoes. From
Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flo~, pp. 28-30.
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made officers of each branch more sympathetic to the problems of the other specialties.
Admiral Charles Beresford, commenting on the situation previous to the Selborne Scheme, declared: "In 20 years
time Naval Officers will wonder how a steam navy could
possibly have been run and administered by an executive
who knew nothing vrhatever about steam or mechanical appliances . 1I 3 Indeed, it also seems unlikely that such officers
could have got t en the most out of their ships. This, in an
age

when technology was invading warfare more and more,

i . e . bigger and more powerful ships.
Better o.f:ficers "'Iere needed to man these more soph:iticated ships,but at the same time many potential officer
candidates were excluded from the service because of the
high cost of naval education. In fact, only 1i million out
of

B~itain's

total population of 43 million could afford it.

There was also opposition from the Dfficer-class to the
recruitment of the lower classes as officers. The Naval and
Military Record echoed this sentiment in 1910 with: "We
should view with grave apprehension any attempt to officer
the fleet at all largely \vi th men of humble birth. It Fisher
attacked the existing system on the grounds that it contradicted Britain.' s democratic principles and because it ·
wasted potential naval genius. Horatio Nelson, after all,
woul d have been excluded by the turn-of-the-century system.
]'isher strove to have all fees abolished at the Naval Colleges

40
of Osborne and Dartmouth. Though not abolished entirely
until 1947, they were reduced 50 percent in 1913 under
Churchill for one-quarter of the entrants of \,lhich three-

f~fths · were to be . the sons of needy parents. 4 .
Another Fisher reform came in the much neglected area
of training for high level officers. He managed to have
instituted in 1900 a War Course. It had as part of its
curriculum the study of naval history, strategy, tactics,
and international law. Officers were selected for it by
appointment, making the course mandatory and providing
full pay unlike the previous voluntary courses vlhere
officers served on half-pay. In 1903 the original eight
month course was divided into two four month sections.
They were expanded in 1908 to include the examination of
problems sent to them by the Director of Naval Intelligence. The War Course, originated by Fisher, has continued
in one form or another to the present day though its name
has changed. 5 This was an important step toward a more
logical and systematic approach to the study of ·naval war,
but at this point Fisher failed to take the next vital step
of establishing a naval staff.
The system of reserves was altered so that they would
b e more capable of manning the Fleet when the need arose.
IvIerchant seamen and fishermen were trained in modern ships
at sea rather than, as they had been, in shore batteries
and harbor hulks. In order to keep a hold on experienced
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men, the Royal Fleet Reserve \'las f'ormed of' men leaving the
Navy. Amateur seamen such as yachtsmen were incorporated
into the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, f'ormed in· 1903.
Boys, who had previously been trained on rigged training
vessels, were now trained in land schools, in n.u cleuscre\'led vessels, and in armored cruisers . 6 These changes
brought the reserves into contact with up to date f'ighting
methods.
As Commander-in-Chief of' the r.o1edi terranean Fleet (1 8991902), Fisher had f'ought f'or earlier promotions, arguing
that "The increasing average age of' our Admirals is appalling!
In a f'ew years you'll see them all going about with gouty ·
shoes and hot water bottles!" A committee under Lord Goschen
was set up to study the promotion problem. Byanorder-incouncil of' 1903, its recommendations were adopted. They
redu(fed the minimum age limits f'or high level officers by
three to f'ive years and lmvered the retirement age by two
to three years so that the youngest captains would average
36 t o 37 years of' age, rear admirals 41 years,and vice
admirals 52 years. 7

Fisher ' s concern f'or the welfare of the "Lower Deck"
increased naval morale. Rations "/ere improved through the
provision of' shipboard bakeries to replace "hard tack" and
seamen were finally allowed the simple luxury of' using
;-

knives and f'orks to eat with. Cruel and brutal punishments
were f'orbidden; pay and the chanc e s of promotion were
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increased. 8 These simple reforms, by Fisher, made naval
life more attractive so that a better quality of man would
be willing to serve in the Fleet.
Turning to materiel, ]'isher first reorganized the
ship reserve system then went on to change the materie'l i tself. Under the old system there had been two reserves-the Fleet Reserve containing ships ready for mobilization
or commission but not immediately needed and the Dockyard
Reserve consisting of obsolete ships needing considerable
time to ready for service and not likely to be used except
in an emergen,cy. ,To replace this, Fisher introduced his
nucleus-crew system whereby the ships of the Fleet Reserve
were to be manned by two-fifths of their required crews,
including all the specialists and officers· needed for battle. The ships took practice

crui~es

so their crews could

familiarize themselves ""i th the handling an.d qualities of
each ship. The ships were'organized-into three reserve
divisions which operated together as units for 10-14 days
a year and so'were capable of joining in fleet actions
without great difficulty. Upon mobilization, the Fleet
Reserve could be brought up to strength quickly by filling
out the crews with men from onshore barracks and the instructional establishments. Balfour said in 1906 that "this
new Reserve scheme has augmented the fighting power of the
British fleet not once or twice, but threefold. " Fisher,
himself, called it li the keystone of our preparedness for
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war" because it meant that the whole sea-go ing fleet

viaS

" instantly ready for war. 1I9
Fisher found men for his nucleus-crew system by
scrapping many of the obsolete ships Britain had maintained in the far corners of the globe for little more
reason than "showing the flag." lJIost of . these ships were
either- \'looden with masts and rigging , had muzzle loading
guns, or were protected with armor plating too thin to
stop a modern proj e ctile. A special committee was appointed
to investigate the si tuati.o n. As a result, 154 ships were
struck off the effective list. Fisher calnulated the
savings at ,,(845,000 per year on repairs alone. 10 When an
earthquake occurred in 1907 in Jamaica, United states relief vessels arrived first because of Fisher's reductions.
This caused a public outcry against Fisher t s program because it seemed to r educe British prestige. Fis.her

r~sponded:

. I see the Globe has a leading article attacking the Admiralty for not having an ambulance corps
of cruisers and . gunboats distributed over the
earthquake area of the globe! The Navy Estimates
would be a hundred millions if everyone had every~
thing!11
The costs of keeping a naval presence in strength everywhere would have weakened British efforts against the
German challenge and . would probably have ban.l{:rupted her.
To face the German threat, Fisher introduced the principle of concentrating the Fleet in home waters (around the
British Isles ) during wartime and having it clo se by whil e
peace prevailed. Under the former distribution of fl ee ts ,
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the Hediterranean Fleet consisted of "twelve battlesh.:lps,
the Channel Fleet (not always in the Channel) eight, "and
th~

Home Fleet eight of the older battleships.· Fisher

brought the Home, renamed the Channel Fleet, up to seventeen battleships by adding four withdrawn from the I'Iediterranean and five from the China station .. The Channel
Fleet was renamed the Atlantic Fleet and vIas to contain
eight of the newest battleships. Based at Gibraltar, it
was able to reinforce quickly either the Mediterranean
or Channel Fleets if necessary. 12 In a letter of 24 January
1907, Fisher boasted that these moves had allowed for the
manning of 12 battleships and armored cruisers, 48 destroyers
with all attendant auxiliary vessels, and a 25 percent increase in the size of the nucleus-crew system. 13 .Even if
Fisher's figures were exaggerated, the redistributiori of
the fleets put Britain's strength in northern European
waters, where it was being chall.e nged.
BritaiJ;1 ' s huge preponderance of battleships gave her
a wide edge over Germany as long as technology did notcQwe
up with a new \veapon to make it worthless. Fisher

vlaS

de-

termined to see that Germany would. not befirst:t.Q! C0me up with
such a development by coming up with one himself. Before
becoming First Sea Lord, he recognize.d the need for a
change in battleship design. His Flag-Captain at Portsmouth,
Sir Robert Arbuthnot, recorded him saying that gunnery
ranges would have to increase to keep up with the progress
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being made in torpedoes. Fisher indicated that the Russians
had torpedo es that could hit from 3 ,000 yards at 24 knots
and "soon it will be 5,000 yards, and then where i s your
gunnery going tobe?1I 14 It was true .that prior to 1903, gunnery ranges averaged about 3,000 yards . Prornpted by
some French and Italian successes at lengthening this
range, the British Navy began its own tests which showed
in 1898 that future ranges were likely to be at around
5-6,000 yards . At that distance the range could only be
determined by observing the splashes of salvoes of at
least four shells and preferably more. This could only be
accomplished by ships having a number of guns of the same
calibre, making the installation of multi-sized guns obsolete. Admiral Bacon commented in his biography of Fisher
that lIit was evident that our future battleships should be
armed primarily :"i th a sufficiency of guns of one uniform
size. ,,15 Thus the need to build a ship with guns of the '
same size was evident to Fisher. The question, though, still
remained, what would it s designind.l ude:?
Designs for the first . "all-big-gun" battleship as
well as for the first battle cruiser were drawn up under
Fisher while he was stationed at Portsmouth a.s Second Sea
Lord. W. H. Gard, the Chief Constructor at Portsmouth,
advised on questions relating to the hull, weights, and
displacement. The Managing Director of the Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, Alexander Gracie, supplied
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information on the boilers and machi!lery. Various naval
officers suggested armament schemes. The designs were
almost complete. when Fisher bacame First Sea Lord in October 1904. 16 According to Jane's Fighting Ships, 1919 the
designs called for:
a battleship with 12 12-inch guns arranged in
pairs along centre line; three pairs of guns at
bOv/s', thre e stern, the inner barbettes rising in
tiers, so that six guns could fire ahead, six
astern , and all twelve on broadside.
A commission set up to study the designs scaled them down
to a ship carrying e ight guns, "two forv/ard, two aft, ·two
on each . beam. II A fifth turret was later added "because it
happened to fitll17 (see figure t) .
Fisher unveiled his creation, the Dreadnought, early
in 1906. She was "larger, faster, and more powerful " than
any other battleship in existence. At 21 knots, the Dreadnoug~t

was 2 knots faster than any other battleship afloat

and carried ten 12-inch guns in comparison to the four
12-inch and four 9. 2-inch guns . of the last "pre-dreadnoughts"
except for the "Lord Nelson" class which had four 12-inch
and ten 9.2-inch guns. In weight of broadside, the TIreadnought fired 6 , 800 pounds compared to 4;160 pounds for the
"King Edward II clas s. of pre-dreadnoughts and 5,300 pO\l1lds
for the " Lord Nelsons. " Design success is readily apparent
from the fact that every capital ship since the Dreadnought
has had a primary armament of eight to twelve large guns ' of
a single calibre. Secondary armament was eliminated except
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DREADNOUGHT (February, 19(6).
NDrma! displacement, 11,900 tons. Full load, about 20;700 tons. Compialnent, a6:!.
.
31 feet. }Le·n
gth, (0.0. ) 5"6
I (p.p. 4n" Ofcet.
)
Maximum draught,
..
26},,·
- ) eet
Length (,r.l), 520 !eet. Beam, 82 feet. { Mean
Guns:
10......012 inch, 45 CIl!. } n' Con·
10--12 pelr.
1r..
2-,.-3 inch (anti-aircraft, 13
pdr.)
2-12 pdr. (anti-aircraft)
4-3 pdr.
5 M.G.
(1 landing)
Torpedo tubes (IS inch) :
4 8ubmerged (8roadside)

Armour (R.C.) :
11"-9' Lower belt.•.••
8' Upper belt,! ....•.••
ll"' Bulkhead (aft) ...•
6" Belt (bow) .•.•. - •.
4: Be~t (stern) . _•.•••
11 ..-.8 ;narbettel< .•••.
12.. Gunnouse~" •.... •. .
11 Fore C.T.•..•.•• ..
5; Fore.com. tube ••••
8 .. After.C.T. i • • • • • • •
. 4 After ~om, tuhe • •.

f

,
Armour (K.N.C.) :
!
t" Main (forward) ••• -.,..;
Ji Ii" (nat) Middle •.••• ,.§
~ 2!," (slope) (amidships) ; ~ -<
~.t 4" at en.dS (Middle) " .• r:::..1
3'_1" Lower
Specia.l protecti~~:::::
.. Screens to Mags., &0.

J

I

.

~

Astern ~

4to612 in.

Ahead:

4 to 6......

It in.

Broadside i 8-12 in., 1-:18 in. tube.
Machinery: Pa.rsons turbine. 4 screVl"S. Boilers: 1.8- Babcock & 'Vilaox in 3 groups.
Designed H.P, 23,000 = 21 I,ts. Coal: normal, 900 tons; maxi?lwm, 2900 tons
1120 tons oil
120 tons pat!'nt fuel. Nominal radius: 6600 at 10 kts.; 5000 at 19 kts.

+

+

Torpedo Notu.-Stcrn

tll~

removed during War.
re\·olution~.· One H.P. ahead, onc H.P. (:8tern turbine on cach wing shaft: Inner
shafu., 3 turbine!> each (cruising L.P. ahead:. I•. P. astern). 1 nstern tl1rblni:> on each. Boilerpres..urc: 2:'01bs.,
reduced slightly at. the turbines. Earh turblll(, has 39.600 hladeij .. l\lain condensers: 26,000 square feet; auxUlarr:
6000. Gmt.... Filrfac~: 1599 square feet. Heating surface: 5:;.400 square il't't. On trials sbe cx~eded her Ifpced
for short spurt·s (best mile at. 21.78). hut barely uwraged it on her eight. hOUl·.' run, V~rr free from vibrution.
Weight of machinery; main and auxiliar)', j)73~ t()U~ + water = 189'f ton~.
CODl cOlillUmplioll.-Very economical at full speed. abouf 340 ton'· per (lIw for full power. At, slow fipeE'd cOllsumptioQ
is heavy. At 46()O lLP. (I3 kts.) it, averages Jl('arl)' 160 tons a da):. At· 10.000 H.P., about 2.W rons per da)',
.Armollr Noles.-Bo.:;C! of I1mlrl>;hipl< bnrb~tt{'s is 8" only nnclali barbettc baS(l~ S" behhld belt. Protective deck aft Is· 2"
flat, 3" on slope" lind over steering g(,lIr. Internal screens to magazines, &;t'., arc not con'timw1;lS between emi
ba;;.bettc •.
Enqineerill(! NOUR.-}'1I11 power. 400

Na.me.

BuiU at

MachiM11/ 1>11
.~

DreadnOU{lhl

Portsmouth

Vickers

rAid.

d(.th&

Cum.

pleted
!-

--D£e~

'05j"0eL '06

TrieU (mean).
3fJ 1m. nI16,250. 8 h'TS. fu1J..
16,930.. 19'3

24,712" 2()'9t

Beat

Boiler.,

,.,.,cent

B:lbcoc:-k

...

-

~

• Was no~ really complete lOt this date. ]o'1rst conunll!5ion ool;:an Voe., 1006. £262.500 was sp. mt In fini3hing her
..nd £60,400 ofthla 8um was voted in 1007·8. TMaxlmum attained 27,518-21.6 kta.

Fig. 1. From Surgeon-Lieutenant R.
Prendergast, eds., Jane'~ Fighting
Marston, 1919; reprint ed., Newton
David &. Charles, Publishers, Ltd.,

N. Parkes and Maurice
Ships, 1919 (Sampson Low
Abbot Devoh, England:
1969), p. 60.

!
I

48
for twenty-seven 12-pounders designed to repel torpedo
attack. 18 The DreadnOUghtl~~~~~ulted from Fisher's innovation of using turbine engines rather than the then
standard reciprocating engines. Turbines transformed the
engine room from a hell of noise and water (needed to cool
the engines) into a clean and dry place with only a hum
to indicate engine operation. More important than the
physical improvements for the crew, was the improved performance of the ship. Tests had

~ho"m

that pre-dreadnoughts

could achieve a top speed of only 14 knots, then only if
the captain \'las willing to have the ship I s engines · overhauled afterwards. Even cruisers had trouble operating over
long distances at 18t knots ,without having serious engine
damage . The Dreadnought, however, was able to sail from
England to Trinidad and back at an average speed of 17i
knots without any repairs whatsoever being needed. 19
Because of the radical innovations introduced by the
Dreadnought, criticism was to be expected. Its large size,
and consequent greater cost, was attacked because this
meant fewer ships could be built. With fewer ships, . the
critics claimed that the loss of even one would be a severe
blow. The Admiralty refuted this claim by explaining:
For the increase of 1,500 tons of displacement
over the "Lord Nelson»" class we have obtained
a much more powerful armament, a nearly equal
main protection, a vastly superior se~ondary
protection A and a greatly increased sea-keeping power . .c:O
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Size was certainly not a handicap to the Dreadnought as
the trend would. be to even larger and more powerf'ul ships;
the HQueen Elizabeth" class would be the peak of prew'ar
design in this area.
The all-big-gun concept was also attacked, but the
larger calibre gun proved itself even more accurate than
its smaller calibre counterparts during a series of tests
held in 1905. At 6,000 yards the percentages_of hits to
rounds fired were: 12-inch, 37 percent; 9.2-inch, 25 percent;
and 6-inch, 15 percent. The comparative effect of the ·
larger shell bursting within a target ship was estimated
at 70 to 1 in favor of the 12-inch gun. In target battle
practice the Dreadnought fired 75 percent more weight of
shell in ten minutes (21,250 pounds) than any other battleship. One proven deficiency was found in the , 12-pound guns
whicl}. became ineffective once torpedo range was increased
to 7,000 yards. Future "dreadnoughts" received 4-inch guns
as secondary armament until the 1911-12 program when 6-inch
guns were introduced for this purpose. 21
Complementary to the development of the al1-':big-gun
ship

\'laS

the appointment by Fisher of Rear Admiral Percy

Scott in 1905 as the Navy's first Inspector of Target
PrQctice. Within two years Scott doubled the Fleet's sh6oting' accuracy through his method of training by
practice instead of reading about
rate of fire also increased

it~ut

const~~t

of books." The

as a result of his invention
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of the loading tray, dotter, and deflection teacher . Battle
target practice was set at 5-7,000 yards with the target
being a fixed 90 by 30 foot screen fired at by the ship's
cruising at 15 knots. By 1907 the target itself was towed
for increased realism. As of 1908 most ships had better
accuracy at 6-7,000 yards then they had .hadat ·2,000 yards
only a few years earlier. Out of 100 shots in 1898, 69 were
misses; in 1907, at the longer ranges, only 21 shots missed
out of every 100. 22 Though some of this improved accuracy
could have been achieved vii th pre-dreadnoughts t i t \<las the
dreadnoughts which took advantage of this improvement most
by delivery more

weigh~

of shell for every hit.

If the Dreadnought's offensive capa.bilities \'lere sufficient, the critics charged ther.e . must be defensive flaws
Indeed the Dreadnought did sacrifice armor in order to obtain extra speed, but this was a calculated risk. A paper
submitted to the Admiralty Board in 1906 concluded that t .h e
decisive Japanese victory at Tsushimaduring the RussoJapanese War was won because the Japanese Fleet had been
able to use greate.r· speed to take and then maintain a
superior position:
Had they not possessed superior speed, the Japanese would rapidly have lost this advantage • . •
their greater spee'd enabled the Japanese to maintain their advantage and so continue the concentration of fire on the Russian van until so much
damage had been inflicted · that the Russians lost
all order and were crushed. 23
It was logical to . conclude. that as long as armor. was

o.
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adequate, any extra would be purely defensive while more
speed "'JOuld add to the ship's capabil ty of carrying the
offensive to the enemy, which was the Fleet ' s main purpose.
One last major criticism of the Dreadnought was that
by making all existing battleships obsolete, Britain's
preponderance of pre-dreadnoughts was also obsolete. Each
nation was thus starting from scratch in 1906. The Admiralty countered this argument by pointing out that other
nations had not been blind to the advantages of an allbig-gun ship and that one of these might have gotten a
big lead by producing such

a ship in se.crethad not Britain

built the Dreadnought first. 24
Included in the 1905-06 program was the world's first
battle-cruiser, Invincible. She was designed to carry eight
12-inch guns and had a top speed' of 25 knots. Since she had
to sacrifice armor for speed, the Invincible only had the
armor protection of the "l'linotaur" class of armored cruiser.
However, this should not be seen as a defect of the battlecruiser for it was not supposed to fight battleships. Rather,
its raison d'etre was to be fast enough to hunt down and
powerful enough to destroy commerce raiders, act as a fast
wing or van of the Fleet, and be a strong ·reconnaissance
force. 25 Problems would arise only when the battle-cruisers
were to do what they were not designed for i. e. fight
battleships.
At the same time as Fisher was improving the quality
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of the Fleet, he was looking for ways to economize . His
greatest financial achievement was the formation of the
Estimates Committee. Composed of the financial authorities
at the Admiralty, with Fisher as chairman, it ruthlessly
examined requests for funds, reducing or discarding those
not meeting its approval. A net decrease

of~3.5

million

was achieved in the estimates presented to Parliament for
1905-06. 26
Fisher's legacy was a Navy much improved over the one
he had found, but more important, he laid the foundations
in personnel and materiel upon which later reforms ' were
built. Fisher summed up his accomplishments in 1907:
\ve have built the Dreadnought; we have stopped
all foreign shipbuilding for 16 months; we
have successfully adopted the turbine, and 'VIe
have reduced Naval Estimates by 5 millions
(and shall reduce them still more!), while the
Navy is incomparably stronger and more ready for
fighting than it was two years ago ..Our Fleets
are 50 percent more at sea, and we hit the tar- ·
get 50 percent more than we did two years ago. 27
From 1898 until the beginning of the war, Britain and
Germany fought a race for naval supremacy. The German naval
laws of 1898 and 1900 began a construction project which
was to have completed 32 battleships by 1920. Between '1900
and 1905 she laid down the keels of 12 battleships, prompt ing expert British opinion to predict that Germany\'lOuld be
the world ' s second leading naval power by 1906. As early as
1902, Lord Selborne had warned in a Cabinet paper that the
German Fleet was designed for a contest with Britain. 28
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Nevertheless, Britain did not strongly r.eact to the German
challenge until King Edv{ard VII ·-'s v1si t to Riel in 1904.
During the visit, Wilhelm II showed off Gerinan naval
strength and by doing so stimulated the Royal Navy to
action. He further stimulated it by his assertion the
same year that he was "Admiral of the Atlantic." The growing
German challenge was why Fisher redistributed the Fleet.
Part of this redistribution was made possible by a treaty
with Japan which protected British Far East interests.
Also in 1904, Britain made her entente cordial.e vl.ith France
official,and agreement was reached with Russia during 190608 after the Russo-Japanese War had ended. 29 \vith the United
States also considered friendly, there remained Ohly Germany
to be a possible naval threat.
The 1898-1905 period of the race proved to be a failure
for Germany because of her inexperience in building, ,the ·
constraints of the Riel Canal (a large battleship could not
pass through it), and the superiority o.f the British ships
themselves. Expert opinion considered German ships of this
period to be markedly inferior to those of Britain. 30 Then,
of course, Fisher built the Dreadnought and the race was
restarted vlith the disappearance of the vast British predreadnought superiority into obsolescence. Germany ' s first
dreadnought, the Nassau was laid down in 1906. 31
German moves convinced many that she was Britain's
only possible opposition on the seas. In 1906 Fisher wrote
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Tweedmouth, the new Liberal First Lord, that "Germany is
our only possible foe for years to come ! ,,32 Asquith wrote
in 1909 that .there was no reason for Germany to build a
fleet~nless

for aggressive purposes, and primarily against

ourselves. " Grey in 1908 pointed out the difference bet\"/een
the German and British fleets as the following:
If the German Fleet ever becomes superior to ours,
the German Army can conquer this country. There is
no corresponding risk of this kind to Germany; for
however superior our Fleet was, no Naval [Sic~
""
victory v{Quld bring us any nearer to Berlin." 3
Even the design of the German Fleet revealed a challenge
to Britain since it was built so cramped and with such a
small fuel reserve that it w·as only fit for use in the
Baltic

o~

North Sea. Since Bussia was still recovering

from her losses to the Japanese "and the French Navy was
small in comparison to the German Fleet , Germany could bnly
be building such a large fleet for a 'challenge to British
naval supremacy.34 Coupled with the reasons already presented, this provoked a strong British desire to keep
a safe margin over the German Fleet to ensure victory in
any contest between the two.
Despite the fact that Germany appeared to be the only
immediate threat, those in favor of a strong Navy argued
that Britain should build against a two power standard
(any possible combination of two navies) plus 10 percent.
Fisher explained that the Board of the Admiralty could not
just build against the enemy of the moment because they
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"are the trustees of future generations of their COUJltrymen,
who may not enjoy the same comparatively serene sky as ourselves. 1I 35 In other \<lords,Britain had to be prepared to
meet a combination of powers, which though unlikely in the
near future, could nevertheless develop.
British naval construction

vTaS

set at four dreadnoughts

(battleships or battle-cruisers) per year in 1905 by the
"Cawdor IVlemorandum" before the Conservative Government
under Balfour left office. The incoming Liberals like
Campbell-Bannerman and Lloyd George were politically committed to a program of less spending on armaments so one
ship

ViaS

cut from the 19061-07 estimates and two:fromthe

1907-08 unless the upcoming Hague Conference failed to slow
the naval race. 36 At the 1907 conference, German Admiral o;f
the Fleet, Alfred von Tirpitz rejected Brit,ish overtures
o:f naval reductions as being unacceptable to the German
public:
Here is England, already more than :four times as
strong as Germany, in allianc e with Japan, and
probably so with France, and you, the colossus,
come and ask Germany, the pygmy, to disarm. 3"'
There:fore the Liberal Government laid down three battleships in their 1907-08 program compared to Germany ' s two
battleships and one battlecruiser, their :first. 38"
Then, the German Reichstag upset the situation even
mo re by amending the 1900 Navy Law in 1908 to the effect
that from 1908-09 to 1911-12 Germany would lay down four
dreadnoughts per year, three battleships and one battle...:.
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cruiser. Even so, the Admiralty only requested funding;t'or
one battleship, one battle-cruiser 1 sixteen destroyers, and
~500,000

for submarines in the 1908-09 estimates. This pro-

jected Britain having seven battleships and four battlecruisers against Germany's predicted three and one,respectively, by 1910. 39 As a result of German construction
acceleration and the Liberal unwillingness to make a major
increase in British naval spending, the "two power, plus
10 percent" standard was replaced by one of· "60% above
German strength in every class of vessels." Even Admiral
Sir John ·Jellicoe, future commander of the Grand Fleet,
agreed that the old standard had not been correct. 40 This
apparent s-lackeiting of the race was not to last however. The
new standard did, though, represent a decrease in the number of ships Britain was committed to build.
The Admiralty asked fOr ,six dreadnoughts in the 1910-11
estimates to match Germany's expected four and Austria's
two. A compromise was reached by which Britain \,/as to have
five ships each in the 1910-11 and 1911-12 programs. With
the

estimat~s

topping £40 million, the Royal Navy was to

have 25 dreadnoughts by rllarch 1913 plus 2. battle-cruisers
promised by New Zealand and Australia compared

\'1i

th a pro-

jected figure of 17 for Germany and 2 Austrian. The figures
for German strength were based on the assumption that Germany's program would continue at the 1909 rate. 41
Another attempt was made at naval limitation talks
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in 1909, but the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg 's stipulation that an agreement be made to "exclude all possibility of' attack by one party on the other" as Germany's
price for naval limitation,

resuI.tedl in an impasse. Talks,

nevertheless did proceed on other issue.s, such as exchange
of building timetable information and dockyard inspectio~s~2
Grey commented in 1909 that Germany claimed her naval program was based on the naval la\'ls passed by the Reichstag
in 1898 and 1900 and amended in 1908 rather than against
British building, "therefore there appeared to be no opening for' negotiations. II He was also alarmed by public.lectures in Berlin that discussed the possibility of'invading
England. 43 All f'urther hope for naval reductions was soon
destroyed by 'a

German move in Norocco.

The Agadir Crisis resulted f'rom Germany sending a gunboat, the Panther, on 1 July 1911 to MorQccoin support of'
her African interests. This was the third s erious crisis
since 1905. The others had also involved an assertion of' .
~ermany's

right to confer with other nations on major di-

plomatic matters. The German view of the Agadir Crisis ' was
that since French absorption of Morocco seemed

inevitable,

France should be made to compensate ,Germany f'or the loss of'
her interests in the area. The British Government suspected
that this compensation would includ e a large chunk of the
French Congo and a naval base :on f.Ioroc.co's Atlantic coast;
the Germans were already negotiating with local chic:ftainr.;
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on this latter point. 44 In the world of skilled professional
diplomacy, the German action was viewed as an irresponsibly
provocative act. I'-'Iany who had opposed British armaments
changed sides once German aggression was so clearly demonstrated. Churchill, a long time foe of naval spending, .
\'Irote · in an undated 1911 letter that German "action at Agadir
has put her in the wrong & forced us to consider her claims
in the light of her policy & methods."Re even advocated
joining France if a war was- to break out bet\'Ieen the two
unless the French had taken a stand On "unjustifiable
ground.,,45 On 21 July 1911 Lloyd George delivered his
famous Mansion Rouse speech in which he condemned German
actions and called on Britain to prevent "a disturbance of
international peace. " If Germany remained intractable"and
i f peace could only be retained by Britain losing her place

" in the Cabinet of· nations," he declared that "then L say

emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation
intolerable for a great country like ours to endure. 1I46 Sur""';
prisingly, a German base

in Norocco was of little concern

to the Admiralty because they felt that i t could be easily
isolated and captured during the first few \'leeks of a war. 47
Another consequence of the Agadir Crisis was the rene\'lal
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 48 British reaction was, as
Churchill had said, to Germany ' s means of action rather than
to her demands, themselves. Agadir impelled the British to
face the possibility, much more closely, of an ultimate
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conflict \"i th Germany.
It became knm'ffi in London in early 1912 that Germany
was considering a new naval law which "Iould acerbate the
naval race even more. Worse than additional construction t
was the provision to keep the German High Sea Fleet on
permanent mobilization. Adoption of permanent mobilization
by the Royal Navy\vould have cost Britain an additional
£3 million per

yea~

plus it would have necessitated the

concentration of the entire Fleet in home waters. 49 Churchill, as First Lord, stated that any German increase in
construction would be met "2 keels to 1." In addition, he
said that a German fleet always in full commission Ifexposes
us to constant danger only to be warded of'f' by vigilance
approximating to war conditions." · By his calculations, the
Royal Navy had to have a clear superiority in ships, 'J?eady
to meet a German f'leet in battle at 24 hourIs notice. 50
The last ef'fort to slow the naval race took place at
this time with Haldane's mission to Germany. · Continued
Germany insistence on British neutrality in a continental
war and Tirpitz's proposal for a 3:2 ratio between the
British and German navies made agreement impossible. Grey
refused to continue talks after this because he feared they
might have jeopardized his agreements vii th France. 51 The
stage was now set for the last leg of' the race, the one to
war.
Churchill's 191 2- 13 estimates began a program which
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would alternate between :four and three dreadnoughts per
year. Hence, it would run 4-3-4-3-4-3 agatnst the original
German plan of two ships a year . The new German program,
however, provided :for a program o:f 2-3-2"':2,.... 3~2 .0 To keep
the " 60 percent" •standard in force, ·Churchill proposed a
new program of

4-5-4-4-4~4

(the first year's figure included

the donation of a battleship :from the Federated Malay States ).
It was Churchill ' s opinion that continued British building
would eventually dishearten German ef:forts. 52 Churchill also
introduced a new standard whereby though an overall "60· percen1J'
margin would still be kept, in .home waters he declared that
a "50 percent margin" was enough. 53 Tirpitz suggested in
February 1913 that a British:German ratio o:f 8:5 was acceptable to him, but Grey rejected the o:ffer because of the
continued building of Austria and Italy as \vel1 as because
"what Tirpitz said does not amount to much , and the reason
:for his saying it is not the love of our beauti:ful· eyes,
but the extra :fi:fty millions required :for. increasing the
German Army. " The 1913-14 British naval estimates were thus
approved at

~46,309,000,

providing for five dreadnoughts
against the demands by some naval advocates for six. 54
Canadian :failure to contribute expected ships caused the
1914-15 estimates to hit.;(51,580,000 as four dreadnoughts
were to be laid down with possibly a fifth :from the 1915-16
program to be started early. Reductions were promised in
the estimates for 1915-16. 55 ,These reductions never occurred
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because of the outbreak of ",mr.
The victor of the naval race is debatable.

Brit~in

certainly 'von the race quanti tat.i vely' but it was much
closer qualitatively (a question best answered in a com...:
parison of the two fleets, see below). From 1905 until 1916
Germany ' s Fleet reached 75 percent of Britain's only once,
in 1908. On average, the High Sea Fleet was about 65 percent of the Royal Navy's size . Total weight of broadside
was even more in Britain ' s favor, almost 2:1. 56 Britain's
numerical victory was wide at first glance, but her dependence on the Royal :Navy for so much of her military might
necessi tated such a margin to ensure victory, and if qualitative factors are · considered, the margin gro . . .'s much more
narrow.
Another consequence of the Agadir Crisis was a change
at the Admiralty. Despite wa:r:nings from Grey of impending
military danger, · the Fleet was left scattered among several
different home ports with the 2nd Division even having four
days leave. Admiral Wilson,

then t.he · First Sea Lord, was

in Scotland for a pleasure weeke.nd . . Neanwhile the entire
High Sea Fleet was concentrated off Nor1tvay. Hankey later
complained, "What a chance for our friends across the, \'Iatel:'!

Ii

Fisher's former foe Admiral Beresford declared that

" if England had gone to war with Germany in July last,we
Should have sustained a naval disaster." Parliament also
raised the question of n.a val preparedness. 57 Because of
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this pressure, Asquith decided to make changes at the Admiralty. Reginald McKenna, the First Lord at the time, though
an able administrator, was not considered the man capable
of forcing new reforms on the reluctant admiral.s . Haldane
offered to go to the Admiralty and impose reforms like those
he had accomplished at the

~"ar

Office. Asquith, . however,

con~

sidered that sending an "army man" to the Admiralty would
be perceived as an insult by- the admirals so in October
1911 Churchill was selected for the post instead. 58 Churchill ' s task was to update and extend Fisher ' s reforms plus
bring the :Navy into coaperation with the C.I.D. approved
plans of the War Office.
Before beginning his reforms, Churchill had to find a
First Sea Lord with whom he could successfully work. Admiral
Wilson ' s antipathy to a Naval Staff a.fld · to using the B. E ~ F.
on the continent, led to his removal in l{ovember 1911. His
successor,Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, was·ousted a year
later because of his inco.mpatabili ty \'lith Churchill, in favor
of Prince Louis of Battenberg. Battenberg ' s pliability and
general support of reform allO\ved Churchill a free hand in
reshaping the Navy for war . 59
Effective as of 1 Hay 1912 a new command t the Home
Fleets, was created and given to Admiral Sir George Callaghan. It consisted of the First Fleet (fully manned, the .most
modern ships), the Second Fleet (50 percent nucleus-crewed
ships), and the Third Fleet (care and maintenance parties
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on the oldest ships). The Navy was redistributed so that
the new Home Fleet s incorporated the old Home Fleet and
Atlant.ic Fleet plus all the new dreadnoughts as they \vere
completed. In its final form, the First Fleet was to consist of four squadrons of eight ships each plus a fleet
flagship. Including the eight nucleus-crewed ships of the
Second Fleet, this would amount to 41 total British ships
. 191 3 t 0 ma t c h an es t·lmat e d 25 German s h·lpS. 60 Th e new
In
organization of the Navy gave Britain a sufficient home
water superiority, on watch constantly,. to ensure victory
against any surprise attack by Germany.
Churchill, like Fisher before him, instituted anum- .
ber of personnel reforms. He eliminated certain humiliating
punishments and curtailed the powers of the ships' police,
brought about a more generous leave system, gave officers
and men a slight pay increase, and

emphasizedpromoti~n

by

merit. Over several senior officers, Churchill made Rear
Admiral David Beatty his Naval Secretary and promoted Vic eAdmiral John Jellicoe, twenty-first on the list of twentyt\,IO

vice-admirals, to the Second-in-Command of the Home

Fleets, a post virtually assuring him the command_after
Callaghan. 61 Through these moves, Churchill brought able
men, men whose careers had been built in the dreadnoughts,
to .the places of power.
Again, like Pisher, Churchill had a deep interest in
improving mat§riel. He installed 15-inch guns,

th~owing
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1,920 pound projectiles, in the five ships of the 1912-13
program. Fisher had already innovated a 13 ·. 5-inch gUl'i. in
the six ships of 1909-10. In addition to heavier armament,
Churchill made the 191.2 ships into a "fast squadron" by the
installation of oil rather than coal fueled engines. Oil
reserves were ensured by the Governmentrs purchase of a
controlling share in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The
quantity of the reserves to be kept in Britain was to be a

4!

month supply for reasons of economy though the Fisher

Royal Commission, investgating the matter, had recommended
a four year supply. During 1917 reserves '''ere to .fall dangerously low, a three week rs supply overall with some bases
only having six days worth o.f oil. The change to oil was
thus a dangerous move because of Britain's dependence
imports~

all

but the oil-.fueled ships were superior to cQal-

fueled ones, 62, ·and. oil, . like Fisher rs turbine engines, vIas
the .future trend. Likewise, Churchill ' s 15-inch guns were
logical extensions of Fisher's

12-inc~ers

as they strength-

ened the "all-big-gun" principle.
On the matter o.f the Naval Staf.f, Churchill differed
from Fisher. Hankey had continually recommended and worked
for the Staff, but Fisher and Admiral Wilson had both
blocked it. When Churchill became First Lord, Esher pass.ed
on to him some of

Haa~ey's

arguments for the Staff. Haldane

also advised the creation of such a staff. Having been convinced, Churchill announced the formation of a "Naval l'lar
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Staff!! on 1 January 1912 which \Vould have the responsibility of:
. sifting, developing, and applying the results of history and experiment, and of preserving them as a general stock of reasoned opinion
available as an aid and as a guide for all who
are called upon to determine, in · peace or war,
the naval policy of the country.
Even so; the Staff did not become fully operational until
the end of 1917.63 Had the Staff been established under
Fisher, it would have had more time to develop and gain
experience. Then some of the \Var's confusion might have
been prevented, such as the Dardanelles fiasco.
The Naval War Staff \'ias organized under a Chie:4' who
reported directly to the First Sea Lord. It consisted of
three divisions-Operations, Intelligence, and Mobilization.
After the war began, a Trade Division was created from a
section of the . Operations Division. The Staff·s function
was to study the operational side of war rather than the
technic2.l or materiel sides. To train officers in staff
duties the Royal Navy Staff College was established in 1912
at the Naval Vlar College, Portsmouth. Though· hailed by
Esher as "the most pregnant reform which ·has been carried
out at the Admiralty since the days of Lord st. Vincent ,1t
the Staff \'las only advisory and hence often ignored. 64
Other problems, besides the lack of executive authority,
were also apparent. The First Sea Lord. should have been
also the Chief-of-Staff and thus more closely involved with
it, the Staff ' s duties should have been more clearly defined
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so as to not conflict with those of the First Sea Lord, and
a better quality of officer should have been attracted to
the Staff. The absence of good officers was because of the
general dl.istrust of the Staff, whicb, was present throughout .
the Fleet. Only after the war bagan was there more attention
given to the Staff, but even then many of its recommendations
were ignored. 65 The formation of a staff was a necessary
move; its failure to accomplish more dramatic results was
due both to its belated creation and to the faults in its
structure, allowing the conservatism of high ranking officers
to block its efforts.
As early as 1908 Fisher had held discussions with the
French as to which operations and zones might be left to
them in the IVledi teranneari during war if both nations were
allies. Only Asquith, Grey, and :fv1cKenna in the Cabinet had
knowledge of the talks at thqt time. 66 Discussions ",ere
resumed under Admiral Wilson which culniinated in the formation of detailed war contingency plans calling for the concentration of the French Fleet in the Mediterranean while
the British Navy took on the responsibility of defending
the French Atlantic and Channel coast. 67 This being contingent upon the two nations entering a war as

allies~

In

September 1911 the French offered to take full responsi -:bility for the Mediterranean. Since this was accepted by
Admiral Wilson, the French proceeded to concentrate twelve
fully commis s ioned battleships arid six armored cruisers
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there hy January 1912. 68
The importance of the I1edi terranean to British commerce
was unquestioned. According to a Cabinet report from the
Board of Trade, a large percentage of her imported wheat,
barley, oats, .oil, and iron ore came either from it or
through it. Despite this,the report concluded that if the
IJ[edi terranean were closed by a hostile fleet, there would
only be a fe\v weeks of inconveni·,e'nce until new sources of
imports and new routes of trade could be

established~

Chur-

chill refuted arguments made by Esher for a strong British
naval presence in the Nedi terranean by p.o inting out that a
victory in the vital sector of the North Sea would have farreaching effects on the other theaters, but that the reverse could not occur. He added:
Dispersion of strength, frittering cif money, empty
parades of foolish little ships "displaying the
flag" in unfrequented seas, are the .certain fea:tures ofoa ,policy leading through extravagance to
defeat. "r
In contrast, the C. I. D., discussing the IJIedi terranean si tuation on 4 July 1912, decided that a Royal Navy presence
there ,,,ould have an advantageous effect on the wavering
nations of Italy and Turkey, so it recommended the stationing there of a fleet equal in strength to one of the
IVIedi terranean powers, excluding France. This was determined to be three to four battlecruisers , four armored
cruisers, and four

pre~dreadnoughts

based at

~alta.

Other

ships were t o be added as they and manpower became free .

68

·
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Cabinet approval for the scheme came on 5 July.
Once the question of whether or not to keep British
ships in the I-ledi terranean was settled, the problem of
commitment or noncommitment to France had to be tackled .
On 17 July Churchill warned the French naval attache that
naval arrangements had no effect on political decisions.
A draft Anglo-French naval statement follo\'led on 23 July,
saying that any naval agreements were binding only if both
nations found themselves to be allies in a war. All peacetime dispositions were declared to be independent actions
not based on a prearranged plan. 72 In spite of this formal
declaration of noncommitment, the French Foreign Minister,
Pierre-Paul Cambon, was able to ask Grey on 1 August 1914:
Are you going to let Cherbourg and Brest be bombarded? . • . when it is by your advice and with
your consent, and to serve your interests as well
as our · own, tha13we have concentrated all our
ships far away.
Cambon was right; Britain had made a moral commitment to
France even if it were not legally binding. Britain would
have had to defend the northern coast of France, though
she was not formally committed to do so, or suffer t he
contempt of world opinion.
TvfO main strategic considerations had to be analyzed
by Britain before the war-invasion and blockade. Invasion
had to be prevented by the Fleet as one of its reasons for
existenc e . The blockade of German ports was seen as the
only way to force a fight or to use superior seapower if
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Germany kept its fleet in port. Yet to be

det~rmined

was

ho\'o/' to accomplish both objectives.
After vie\'ling the German Army maneuvers of 1906 ,
Churchill wrote, "I am very thankful there is a sea between that army and England.,,14 He therefore recommended
to Fisher in 1908 that a regular army should be retained
at home in order to repel an invasion of up to 150,000
men (this was thought to be the highest practical figure
for an invasion). "Would it or would it not be \'vorth while"
to Germany he questioned "to sacrifice 60,000 men for the
pleasure of burning London?,,75 Again it must stressed that
any invasion attempt had to be stopped by the Fleet as the
British Army was too small for such a task, especially if
the B.E.F. was sent to the continent. The C.I.D. concluded,
after an exhaustive study of the question, that as long as
British seapower remained supreme, there

viaS

no danger of

invasion. It said, nonetheless, that an army should be on
guard to repel any raids of under 70,000 men that might
elude the Fleet. It was the C.I.D. ' s recommendation that
a small regular force should be kept in addition to the
mobilized Territorials to defend against this eventuality.76
Some admirals even favored Lord Robert's conscriptionist
theories because they thought that a large home army would
fr e e the Fleet from having to watch the British

~oasts

for

an invasion fleet. General naval opinion, however, was confident . that the Fleet alone would be able to prevent an
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invasion. In this they agreed with st. Vincent ' s statement
during a similar invasion scare of the nineteenth century:
"I do not say they CarLYJ.ot come, my Lords. I only say they
cannot come by sea. ,, 77 Naval confidence was high on this
matter, and, as it happened, no invasion or raid to land
troops vIas to be made during the war.
Actual Fleet exercises dealing with invasion were
carried out in 1912 and 1913. In the July 1913 maneuvers
the defences of the east coast were tested. Jellicoe, in
command of the invasion fleet, was able to elude the defensive fleet and land 40,000 men. The exercises were
cut short for fear of giving valuable information to Germany. Hankey took a calmer view of the exercises as he
pointed out that of 10.7.,000 men attempting to invad e ,
46,000 had been assessed as "drowned or captured II \'lhile
18,000 more. mEn had been taken ?ff by the invasion fleet
after having landed. This left 43,000 men, which Hankey
was confident that the home forces would be able to take
care of. 78 Finally in 1914, just before the war, the C.I.D.
reiterated its 1907-08 conclusions that a small regular
force plus the Territorials would be sufficient to defeat
any invasion which might slip by the Fleet. 79 The fear of
invasion, nevertheless, affected many as.p ects of British
military planning. The Fleet was tied to stopping one,
regular forces had to be detached from the B.E.F. to meet
one, and it increased the already high tension between
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Britain and Germany.
Blockading Germany and preventing a like blockade of
Britain \'lere major concerns for the Royal Havy; While
invasion could cause sudden defeat, a ..blockade could slmvly
starve Britain into submission. By the late nineteenth
Britain \'las dependent on imports for two-thirds
of her foodstuffs and much of her raw materials. 80 There
century~

was never more than a six weeks' food supply in hand so
that the effects of commerce raiding could also have
grievous consequences on Britain within a relatively short
tirrie span. Enemy cruisers were the expected weapons of
commerce raiding and although losses were expected to be
heavy at first, the Chief Umpire of the 1906 maneuvers observed:
It is practically certain that the commencement of
the third week of the war would have seen all
co~~erce destroying ships either captured or blo~k
aded in their defended ports.
This prediction was only partially ac.c1l1.rate since it .did · not
forese:e the development of the submarine as a long range
weapon. Only Fisher disagreed with the consensus that no
civilized nation would use the submarine because it could
not pick up the survivors of the ships it might sink.
Churchill believed this right up to the beginning of the
war. 81 In contrast, Churchill was correct in hi~ assessment of the importance of keeping Britain's commerce f10\',-ing. Order, he said, "depends almost exclusively upon the
poorer people being able to purchase a certain minimum
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amount of the staple foods, especially bread , at prices
\vhich they Can afford. ,,82 If Britain were to starve, her
will to fight would soon collapse. This almost did occur
in the spring of 1917 when Germany launched unlimited
submarine warfare.
A blockade could also be an offensive weapon for
Britain as an Admiralty statement in 1906 concluded,that
"the British threat upon German trade is a tremendous one,
both by reason of Britain's overwhelming preponderance at
sea and of her geographical position" 83 · (see rvlap . 1 ). When
the Declaration of London in 1907 threatened to minimize
the effects of blockade by contravening a belligerent na":'
tion's right to seize neutral shipping, Hankey was one of
those who fought against British ratification. Eventually
the House of Lords rejected it, but the Liberal Government
clairp.ed that it would abide by it anyway.84 By 1908 a
Nelsonian "close blockade" had been made impractical by
the development of mines and torpedoes, so it was decided
that in future the blockading fleet would withdraw out
of surprise torpedo range,at night. In 1912 an'bbservational
blockade" (see map) vias substituted, whereby cruisers' and
destroyers would patrol a line from Norway to Holland in
order to give warning of a German fleet approaching Britain.
Just before the war, this too was discarded in favor of a
blockade of the entire North Sea to lessen attrition on the
Royal Navy. This new strategy provided for the patrol of
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the Straits of Dover and of the northern exit between
Scotland and Norway. The Grand Fleet (the renamed Home
Fleets) was to wait in port for the patrolling cruisers
to intercept the High Sea Fleet, and periodically make
sweeps of its own in an attempt to catch the German Fleet
out of its ports. 85 The new strategy allowed the Germans
out of their ports but confined them to the North Sea. It
also economized on the losses which would have been suffered
from German raids on a "close" or .'~observational blockade ~"
Essential.to the success of this rllong blockade lf was
a base on the east coast. Among the contenders were (see
map) Rosyth, Cromarty, and Scapa Flow. Rosyth was eliminated
because if the Forth Bridge was demolished, it would have
blocked the Fleet off from the sea. Cromarty and Scapa Flow
were at equal distances from the German bases and far enough
away from them in stDrmy waters to lessen the dangers of a
surprise raid by destroyers or submarines. After much discussion, Cromarty \vas chosen as the Fleet "s base over
Scapa Flow because of the latteri's inaccessibility by land
from Britain and the impossibility of defending the east
coast from that distance. Scapa Flow was thus left as an
undefended anchorage. When the Admiralty requested funds
to install defences, it was turned dO\vn by

th~

C.I.D. On

Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, vol. 1:
The Road to War, 1904~1914 (L6ndon: Oxford University Press,

1""%1;,pp-.422~23-.-

~
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the east coast only Chatham, far to the south, was a .first
class port at the opening of the war. Surprisingly, when
war began, Churchill sent the Fleet to Scapa Flow. 86 British difficulties in selecting a base were partially due
to the evolutionary state of blockade. Yet the failure
to have a proper base at the outset of the war \'ias an inexcusable oversight and was to result in having the Fleet
sent in 1914 to the totally undefended anchorage at Scapa
Flow.
Tactical thought was infrequently studied by prewar
British naval officers. The same "line of battle!! employed
before Nelson ' s time, and violated by him, still held sway.
Fleets were expected to cruise in columns then rapidly
deploy in a long line for battle. It was true that "line
ahead" (same as II line of battle") \'ias the only way oof deploying a fleet without some ships having their guns masked
by friendly vessels, but it stressed a doctrine which was
too rigid and centralized . in the flagship. Initiative was
thus taken away from local commanders \'iho might have better
kno\'iledge of the situation, because they \'rere used to wai ting for orders from the flagship. Another deficiency was
the lack of British night fighting practice. German ships
practiced this almost half the time, in contrast. Hence
they were ready for the night fighting at Jutland while the
British were not. 87
Combined operations also received little naval study.
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This was because of Fisher ' s opposition to the War Office 1s
continental strategy. H.e preferred quoting Grey ' s statement that "The British Army is a projectile to be fired
by the Navy." Fisher wanted the B.E.F. landed on the Baltic
coast thirty miles from Berlin where i t could draw off
German reserves and disrupt Germany's entire war effort .
Admiral Wilson continued Fisher's arguments, but the appointment of Churchill to the Admiralty soon ended these
naval schemes and brought the Navy in line with War Office
thinking. 88 Only after the war had started \vould Churchill
hims elf revive some of these schemes.
When \'-Tar was declared, the British Navy had the backing
of a great naval tradition, but it also had severe

deficiencies ~

The gunnery expert Percy Scott exclaimed:
. . • we had no up-to-date mine layers, nor an
efficient mine; no properly fitted mine sweepers;
no arrangements for guarding our ships against
mines; no efficient method of using our guns at
night; no anti-Zeppelin guns; no anti-submarine
precautions; no safe harbour for our Fleet, and
only a few ships (eight) \vere partly fi tted with
a proper method of firing their guns. O!J.I' torpedoes were so badly fitted that in the early days
of the war they went u§§er the German ships instead of hitting them.
IIi many areas of construction the German ships were equal
or superior to their ,British counterparts. British ships
had larger calibre guns with a heavier broadside than the
Germans. British fire tended to be more accurate during
most of a battle due to Scott ' s invention of the gun director system. Under this system one man aimed and fired
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all the guns of a ship electronically at the same moment.
In tests between identical ships, director firing scored
six times as many hits as a ship without it. It was not
until Jutland, though, that most British ships had the
system installed. British shells, though larger, had poorer
penetration qualities than German shells . Often they would
just bounce off when hitting at an oblique angle or- they
would detonate before penetrating, thus making a large hole
in the ship's armor rather than exploding in her interior. 90
On paper, British ships were faster than their German
equivalents, but in operation there

~ppeared

little

differ~

ence. At Dogger Bank three German battle-cruisers managed
to elude five British

battle-cruisers~

Likewise the Goeben,

in a headlong race, was able to stay ahead of British battlecruisers in 1914. One reason German ships were able ' to keep
up with the British, despite the broader beam in the German
vessels, was their adoption of a more efficient small tube
boiler in 1907 while the Royal Navy did not get these until 1915-16. 91 German ships were also more heavily armored
and had the armor distributed better. Coal bunkers were
placed in the most vulnerable areas to cushion shell impact, and steps \V'ere taken to prevent shell-flash from entering the magazines. The British did not discover shell-flash
until after they had lost three battle-cruisers to it at
Jutland. , Better compartmentalization and superb pumping and
counter-flooding systems made German ships almost unsinkable.
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Compared with the British battleship Audacious (1910 construction) which was sunk with one mine, the 1909 Goeben
survived five such hits. 92 Gertnan quality "las not surpassed
by the British until the construction of the "Queen Elizabeth" class of dreadnoughts. 93 Superior German construction
was made possible by the fact that German vessels, designed
to fight . for a few days at a time, could sacrifice crew
comfort for fighting efficiency. The Royal Navy on the
other hand was a world navy and so had to have ships capable of making long voyages.
Counter measures against submarines and torpedoes
were totally experimental in 1914. neither was there any
sure way of locating submarines onc e they had submerged.
One defensive measure devised called for the Fleet to
always cruise at high speeds while keeping a zigzagging
course. At the same time destroyers would be screening the
capital ships. In this way submarine s would get only one
shot at

~est

at a very fast moving target with destroyers

ready to interfere at every point. By 1912 the destroyer
had evolved from a torpedo attack vessel into a defensive
measure against submarines and destroyers . themselves, with
the exchange of more and larger guns for less torpedoes.
The Ramillies in 1913 became the firs·t dreadnought, and the
last until after the war,to be fitted with a bulge below
the waterline to take the impact of a torpedo · and prevent
a penetration of the hull. 94 When the Naval War Staff in
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191 2 _warned that Germany might use her submarines for
commerce raiding, Churchill was impressed, but the Board
did not take the suggestion

seriou~ly.

Scott's view that

the submarine had made the battleship obsolete was violently
attacked by naval conservatives. But, at _the same time in
Germany, Tirpitzwas also underestimating the value of the
submarine as a military weapon. 95
Torpedoes were also carried by destroyers,which at
the beginning of the war were considered more dangerous
than submarines. Results of torpedo attacks in the RussoJapanese War had been poor, however. The Japanese _s cored
only 17 hits out of 370 torpedoes fired in battle. But,
since that time, the torpedo's range had increased from
4-4,500 yards (1905) to 11,000 yards (1914) \'lith an overall

-

increase in speed from 19 knots set for 4,000 yards to
45 -kr.l.Ot s set for 7,000 yards. Their diameters increased
from 14 -inches in 1905 to 21 inches by the outbreak of the
war. Admiral Sir William May, Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet,
warned in 1910:
in mi~ty weather an attack by destroyers in a fleet
action is not only possible, but unless recognized
and means are taken to defeat it, such an attack
would probably succeed .96 - Mines had been proven very successful in the Russo-Japanese War as they had sunk fourteen ships, including three
battleships. Yet there was little interest in them among
the British naval experts. Hence,in 1914 the Royal Navy had
no policy for the use of mines and was technically far
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behind Germany and ·Russia in their development. 97
Advances in aerial technology l ed Asquith to appoint
a C.I.D. subcommittee under Esher in 1908 to investigate
military uses of it. · The Air Sub-Committee recommended in
1910 the construction of a rigid airship and the formation
of an aviators corps. In April 1912 the Royal Flying Corps,
with Naval and Nilitary Wings, was created. 98 The . Havyfs
inexperience and -the lack of qualified engineers made
British efforts at developing airships fail while Germany
kept and expanded its lead in this weapon. 99 Planes and
seaplanes received much more attention and enthusiasm at
the Admiralty, especially by Churchill who took to the air
himself. Fisher predicted in 1913 that "aviation will surely
supplant cruisers It as the scouts . of the Fleet. Little thought
was given to planes attacking ships though.: there were . some
advocates of this tactic. 100 British aerial progress was
still in its formative stages at the beginning of the war,
but its possibilities were recognized by those in power.
In 1914 the Fleet was ready to go to war. Its strategy
was no longer at cross purposes to that of the War Office
and it had formulated its plans for a blockade against
Germany if she did not come out and fight. Britain had a
clear edge in numbers even if Germany had a qualitative
superiority. Perhaps the one extra British advantage was
her naval tradition which gave her men the courage to want
. to try battle with Germany . After all, it was Germany which
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\Vas blockaded in the North Sea, not Britain. The German
Fleet which had everything to gain £rom a battle against
the British and nothing to "lose (assuming the £leet i tsel£
was expendable £or some greater purpose such as an invasion
o£ England) contented itself with small raids until even
these grew rare.

CONCLUSION

\'lhen war was declared in 19 14, Britain was far better ·
prepared to take part in it than she would have been in
1898. The British failures in the Boer War proved to be a

stimulus for reform throughout Britain ' s military structure. The Committe e of Imperial Defence was formed, the
Haldane reforms were executed at the \'l ar Office, and at
the Admiralty Fisher and Churchill reshaped · it for \var. By
the outbreak of war , most of the reforms had been accomplished, and though not perfectly prepared for war ( Is any
nation?), Britain did have the military organization to
fight a war in her interests and in her \'lay.
The creation of the C.I.D. was a

vi~al

step in the

process of reforming the British military for it 900rdinated
the efforts of the service departments ",ith each other and
wi th the \'lishes of the Government. During the Continental
versus Blue Water debate it was able to mediate and then
make the recommendation, which \vas accepted, to accept the
former s chool!s plans. The C.I.D. also represented almost
a standing committee on reform since its investigations
and studies often led to changes in military procedure. Its
work on

ae~ial

weapons \vas an example of this. Yet perhaps

the C.1. D. ' s greatest contribution lay in its broad
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approach to d"efence" questions. Be.cause .i t was not con.fined to army or naval considerations, it was able to examine all aspects, even civilian oriented, of a problem
and then present a recommendation not colored by departmental interests.
The Army undoubtedly pro.fited most from the Boer War
because of its direct involvement and failure. It consequently adopted a General-Staff, modernized its tactics
and strategy, and,;above all, was reorganized by Haldane
into a flexible striking force backed by an expandable
system of reserves both as a home defence force and as a
source of reinforcement. The General-Staff coordinate'd the
various sections of the Army in much the same way as the

C.I.D. did for total defence. In addition it made careful
studies of possible future army operations and dre\'! up
detailed plans for every eventuality. The specific go.als
of the plans might be criticized, but their thoroughness
,was extraordinary. This was why the B.E.F. was moved so
quickly and efficiently to the battlefront in 1914.
Naval reform, though not as dramatic ' as Haldane's reforms, was nevertheless necessary and effective. Fisher's
personnel reforms upgraded the quality of officers and roen.
His innovation of the Dreadnought brought about a revolution
in naval warfare. Churchill then extended the Fisher reforms
to include the Naval v.far Staff and an acceptance of the
Army's Continental strategy. In 1914 the British Navy was
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larger than the

G~rman

Fleet and far more confident of

succeSs. Any quality differences were made up by the construction of the "Queen Elizabeths." The Royal Navy, in
short, was aggressive and ready for war. The one major
flaw, the lateness in the creation of the Staff, held it
back from being completely prepared, but in the short
time Churchill had to work, the Navy did begin to take a
serious look at the study of naval warfare which was to
culminate in the fully operational Staff in 1917.
Bri tain ' s island status and small Army made :,the Navy
her main military arm. The Navy was expected to defend
against invasion, plus transport the Army, defend British
commerce, and take the offensive to the enemy_ She was to
succeed in all these areas though the last two were accom- ·
plished only with difficulty. German use of the submarine
as a commerce raider was an qnexpected development, except
to some like Fisher and Scott, so there were no means with
which to meet it. Only after near disaster \'!ould the convoy
system be revived to defeat the submarine. Had there been
a proper staff in existence long before the war, this solution might have been found sooner. Blockade was the Royal
NavyAs answer to an enemy who would not fight. This proved
to be a very effective weapon against Germany as Britain
used her seapower to cut ' uff impDrts and exports and thus
slowly choke Germany.
While the blockade was a contributory factor in bringing
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about Germany r s defeat , it vias Britain r s Army comnii tted to
Continental principles which was to take Germany on as a
land power and hold on even after the French Army was
defeated as an offensive instrument. ,This transformation
of Britain from a naval power to a land power possessing
a strong navy was the result of the Continentalist victory
before the war. Had not this change in policy been made,
it is doubtful whether the British Navy could have had
much effect against German land power even if' the German
Fleet was sunk.
Though Britain had the instruments with which to
fight a war, her conception of what a future Vlar would be
like was colored by the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.
Britain like everyother European nation expected a short
decisive war in which speed would
beginning. In

th~s

mean~everything

at the

belief British leaders were joined by

the major body of expert opinion. A few men like Kitchener
guessed right but they were not heard over those calling
for decisive campaigns. With this conception of what the
war vwuld be like in mind , Britain was prepared to fight
it in her way. The Royal Navy would be her main weapon while
the Army would be used to intervene on the continent. Both
services stood up to their duties "lell. Had such a war come
in 1899 instead of a small colonial affair in South Africa,
Britain ' would have suffered disaster far surpassing that
of the Boer War. Disaster from which it might not havS
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recovered. Such was the difference between 1899 and 1914
because of the t\'rel ve years of intervening reform.
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